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FAST, CHEAP, AND OUT OF CONTROL:
LESSONS FROM THE ICANN DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCESS
by
Elizabeth G. Thornburg*
In this Article, Professor Thornburg addresses certain multijurisdictional
dispute resolution issues arising out of the expansion of the Internet. She
notes that national court systems are ill equipped to handle some of these
international quandaries because of differences in substantive and procedu-
ral law. Significant enforcement problems also arise in multijurisdictional
disputes. Privatized Online Dispute Resolution (ODR) provides an alterna-
tive to national court systems. Professor Thornburg analyzes whether the
Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP) of the Internet Corporation for
Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) provides a good model of global
ODR. She begins y describing the development of the UDRP. She then dis-
cusses the system's qualities and the problems revealed by the operation of the
ICANN process. Professor Thornburg asserts that the UDRP makes a few
good procedural choices, but is nevertheless a flawed system that does not
operate fairly even within its own limited sphere. Finally, Professor Thorn-
burg explores the lessons of the UDRP, and concludes that a just and equi-
table system would share few qualities with the UDRP.
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I. INTRODUCTION: DEALING WITH UNCERTAINTY
The Internet is constantly expanding, both as a means of communi-
cation' and as a means of commerce. 2 As its contacts among people and
businesses expand, more and more disputes will arise and will need reso-
lution. 3 These disputes will evolve out of relationships such as business to
consumer transactions and business to business transactions and may be
contract disputes, breach of warranty claims, or even allegations of fraud.
Others will be disagreements about intellectual property rights such as
trademarks, copyrights, and patents. Some will involve competition law,
raising issues of antitrust, trade disparagement, or other claims of unfair
competition. Disputes will also arise over more personal rights, including
claims of defamation, invasion of privacy, emotional distress, or even per-
sonal injury claims stemming from products sold on the Internet. The
global reach of the Internet and of modern business also makes it likely
that a substantial number of these disputes will involve persons or entities
in different states and countries, some very distant and legally different
from each other.4
Many of these multijurisdictional disputes raise exactly the kinds of
issues typically found in U.S. litigation involving citizens of more than
one state, such as differences in substantive law, procedural rules, and
I For example, the number of Internet users in the People's Republic of China
has risen from about four million at the beginning of 2000 to more than 30 million,
thanks largely to the number of cyber-cafes opening around the country. GreggJones,
By Bits, Web Use Eroding China's Formidable Control, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Aug. 6,
2001, at IA.
2 The number of "small" merchants (those with annual sales from $100,000 to
$10 million) on the Internet is projected to increase from 17,500 in 1999 to 2.6
million in 2004. Alan Wiener, Opportunities and Initiatives in Online Dispute Resolution,
24 SPIDR NEWS, Summer 2000, at 2, http://www. mediate.com/articles/awienerl.cfm
(newsletter of the Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution).
' The New York Attorney General's office reported twice as many complaints
about Internet shopping in 1999 as in 1998. Joseph P. Fried, Internet Complaints Are
Climbing in New York, Spitzer Says, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 2000, at B8. Similarly, the Council
of Better Business Bureaus reported twice as many consumer complaints against
online retailers in 2000 as in 1999. Joanna Glasner, Net Shoppers Still Complaining,
WIRED, June 11, 2001, at 1, at http://www.wired.com/news.
4 Cf William W. Woodward, Jr., Contractual Choice of Law: Legislative Choice in an
Era of Party Autonomy, 54 S.M.U. L. REv. 697, 747 (2001) ("Increasingly, our goods and
services are coming through distribution mechanisms that originate abroad and have
at least one international contact within the chain of distribution.").
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choice of law rules. As the disputes move from interstate to international,
the differences and practical difficulties increase. Differences in substan-
tive law may be more substantial, differences in procedural rules more
significant, differences in the ability to acquire jurisdiction more diverse,
and differences in choice of law rules more complex. 5 Also, multinational
disputes can add a layer of enforcement difficulties. If a defendant does
not have assets in the original forum to satisfy the judgment, the prevail-
ing party must take any resulting judgment to the defendant/judgment
debtor's home country to seek enforcement.6 If the amount in contro-
versy between the parties is comparatively small, 7 the cost of resolving
these legal issues may, as a practical matter, prevent the claimant from
pursuing redress.
Some potential solutions to these international quandaries deal with
the legal differences head on. One solution would be to harmonize sub-
stantive law, so that all countries (or at least those likely to have frequent
Internet contacts) adopt the same rules governing primary behavior,
whether it be consumer transactions, products liability, defamation, intel-
lectual property, or competition law.8 Another option would be negotiat-
I Alejandro E. Almaguer & Roland W. Baggott III, Shaping New Legal Frontiers:
Dispute Resolution for the Internet, 13 OHIO ST. J. Disp. RESOL. 711, 711 (1997)
(identifying personal jurisdiction and choice of law issues as obstacles to resolving
Internet disputes); BUREAU OF CONSUMER PROTECTION, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION,
CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE GLOBAL ELECTRONIC MARKETPLACE: LOOKING AHEAD
4-15, (Sept. 2000), http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/icpw/lookingahead/electronicmkpl.pdf
(discussing choice of law problems).
6 More accurately, the prevailing plaintiff would need to take the judgment to a
jurisdiction in which the defendant does have assets. Unlike the enforcement of
judgments between sister states, no Full Faith and Credit Clause compels
enforcement of a foreign country judgment. For a helpful discussion of the
difficulties one might encounter enforcing a U.S. money judgment in the courts of
various U.S. trading partners, see Committee on Foreign and Comparative Law,
Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Survey on Foreign Recognition of U.S.
Money Judgments, 56 RECORD 378, 410 (Summer 2001) (concluding that "the
recognition of [U.S. moneyjudgments] abroad is subject to inconsistent legal regimes
and a myriad of substantive, procedural, and practical hurdles") (survey prepared at
request of the State Department to aid in its negotiations of the proposed Hague
Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial
Matters).
I One source estimates the median amount of all online transactions as just
$300. The median business-to-business ("B2B") transaction is $800, and more than
half are under $1,000. The median business-to-consumer ("B2C") transaction is $244,
and 37% are less than $100. Wiener, supra note 2, http://www.mediate.com/articles/
awienerl .cfm.
I See A. Michael Froomkin, Of Governments and Governance, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
617, 623 (1999) [hereinafter Froomkin on Governance] (discussing various ways
global law could be harmonized); see also Pamela Samuelson, Five Challenges for
Regulating the Information Society, in REGULATING THE GLOBAL INFORMATION SOCIETY
316, 323 (Christopher T. Marsden ed., 2000) ("As desirable as complete
harmonization of laws may seem in the abstract, achieving harmonization is likely to
be a tediously slow process.").
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ing international treaties agreeing on substantive law that would apply
only to Internet disputes, although distinguishing between Internet activi-
ties and their "real world" impacts is difficult if not fictional. If countries
cannot harmonize their laws to this extent, which seems likely as some of
the legal differences reflect deeply-held policy disagreements,9 an alter-
native would be the negotiation of international treaties concerning juris-
diction and judgment. Everyone would agree about personal jurisdiction,
choice of law, and the enforcement of other countries' judgments. 10
No one believes that any of that will happen, especially not within
the next few years. The resulting uncertainty leaves Internet sellers and
consumers, joint venture partners and competitors, the criticized and the
critics, and owners and users of intellectual property in a state of inevita-
ble risk. When disputes arise out of Internet activity, there is no way to
know with certainty what law will apply and in what forum.11 What's an
Internet user to do? Enter privatized online dispute resolution ("ODR")
systems, an alternative to using national courts (and sometimes national
9 Even in the comparatively harmonized area of contracts of sale, for example,
within the European Union (unlike in many U.S. states) sellers of new consumer
goods may not insert enforceable waivers of consumer rights into their contracts. See
Thomas Krfimmel & Rose M. D'Sa, Sales of Consumer Goods and Associated Guarantees: A
Minimalist Approach to Harmonised European Union Consumer Protection, 26 EUR. L. REv.
312 (2001) (discussing Council Directive 1999/44, 1999 O.J. (L171) 12). Similarly,
many countries refuse to enforce predispute binding arbitration clauses. See
CONSUMER AFFAIRS DIVISION, DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, COMMONWEALTH OF
AUSTRALIA, DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN ELECTRONIC COMMERCE: DISCUSSION PAPER 22-25
(Oct. 2001), http://www.ecommerce.treasury .gov.au (discussing international policy
context).
" Given the debates raging over the proposed Hague Convention on
Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters, which seeks to do exactly this, it is highly unlikely that a
comprehensive agreement will be forthcoming anytime soon. See Anandashankar
Mazumdar, New Hague Draft Reflects Influence of Electronic Commerce Interests on Process, 6
ELECTRONIC COM. & L. REP. (BNA) 830 (Aug. 8, 2001), available at http://
pubs.bna.com/ip/bna/eip.nsf (reporting that the June negotiating session resulted
in a version that is "longer and less finalized than the version issued almost two years
ago"). See also Jean Eaglesham & Patti Waldemeir, Laws Unto Themselves, FINANCIAL
TIMES, July 9, 2001, at 22 (reporting that the June meetings achieved little but an
agreement to resume discussions by 2003, chiefly because of "a fundamental
difference of approach between the US and the EU"). The current draft of the
proposed Convention is available at http://pub.bna.com/eclr/Hague20010802.pdf.
Texts of previous drafts, as well as related information, are available at the web site of
the Hague Conference on Private International Law, http://www.hcch.net. Presently,
it appears that the most optimistic outlook for the proposed Convention would be
some kind of scaled back version, covering some transactions (such as B2B contracts),
but not others.
1 Some try to minimize the uncertainty through contractually imposed
predispute mandatory binding arbitration clauses, creating their own nonappealable
procedures and their own "law." These clauses will not always be enforced in the
countries in which aggrieved contracting parties might file suit. They also have no
role to play in disputes between persons without a contractual relationship unless a
third party has the power to impose arbitration.
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law) that is allegedly faster, cheaper, and more convenient for everyone
involved. 12 Ideally, the design and implementation of ODR systems could
be a unique opportunity to create fair and accessible processes that would
accurately and evenhandedly resolve individual disputes and assure the
enforcement of important national laws and policies. 13 Unfortunately,
ODR systems could also become one more way for "repeat players"1 4 to
replicate their societal advantages, this time on a global level and largely
free of public scrutiny.1 5 Thus the context and structure of the systems
that evolve will be crucially important in ensuring procedural fairness and
the rule of law.
Some suggest that the Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy
("UDRP") 16 currently used by the Internet Corporation for Assigned
Names and Numbers ("ICANN") to resolve Internet domain name dis-
putes is a good model for global ODR.17 This article, however, argues
12 Businesses providing ODR of one kind or another are proliferating. Wendy R.
Leibowitz, Let's Settle This, Online, NAT'L LJ.,July 5, 1999, at A20; Wiener, supra note 2,
http://www.mediate.com/articles/ awienerl.cfm.
13 See BUREAU OF CONSUMER PROTECTION, supra note 5, at 11-12, http://
www.ftc.gov/bcp/icpw/lookingahead/electronicmkpl.pdf (recommending the
development of ADR systems for e-commerce because "ADR can be a practical way to
provide consumers with fast, inexpensive, and effective remedies, and can reduce
businesses' exposure to foreign litigation"); Recommendation of the OECD Council
Concerning Guidelines for Consumer Protection in the Context of Electronic
Commerce (Dec. 9, 1999), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/1999/9912/oecdguide.htm.
14 Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of
Legal Change, 9 LAw & Soc'y REv. 95 (1974).
"5 See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Do the "Haves" Come Out Ahead in AlternativeJudicial
Systems?: Repeat Players in ADR 15 OHIO ST.J. Disp. RESOL. 19, 25-26 (1999) ("To put it
simply, the "Haves" come out ahead by being able to choose and manipulate what
process will be used to enforce substantive rights .... [T]he question of whether
power recapitulates itself in all forms of dispute systems is clearly ripe."); Jean R.
Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme Court's Preference for Binding
Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637, 681 (1996)
(Few would deny that consumers would benefit from a quicker, cheaper system of
justice, all else being equal. However, all else is not equal. The truth is that
businesses opt for arbitration not only to reduce transaction costs that may or may
not accrue equally to consumers, but also to reduce their payouts.);
Llewellyn Joseph Gibbons, RusticumJudicium? Private "Courts"Enforcing Private Law and
Rights: Regulating Virtual Arbitration in Cyberspace, 24 OHIo N.U. L. REv. 769, 774
(1998).
16 ICANN, UNIFORM DOMAIN NAME DISPUTE RESOLUTION POLICY (Aug. 26, 1999),
at http://www.icann.org/udrp/udrp-policy-24oct99.htm [hereinafter UDRP];
ICANN, RULES FOR UNIFORM DOMAIN NAME DISPUTE RESOLUTION POuCv (Oct. 24,
1999), at http://www.icann.org/udrp/udrp-rules-24oct99.htm [hereinafter ICANN
RULES].
17 See Victoria Carrington, Internet Needs Fast, Fair Dispute Resolution Process, 20
LAws. WKLY, Nov. 17, 2000; House Subcommittee Explores Internet Jurisdiction Issues, 1
INTERNET L. & Bus. 822, 824 (2000) (reporting testimony before House Judiciary
Committee's Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual Property that supported
private sector codes of conduct for consumer ADR); David McGuire, US Must Demand
Strong Dispute Framework-Industry, NEWSBYrES, June 29, 2000, at http://
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that although the UDRP makes a few good procedural choices, it is a
flawed system that does not operate fairly even within its own limited
sphere. Its failures provide some sobering reminders of the potential
weaknesses of privatized dispute resolution systems. Section II of this arti-
cle briefly describes the development of the UDRP and the way it works.
Section III discusses the system's more positive qualities, while Section IV
focuses on the problems revealed by the operation to date of the ICANN
process. Section V explores the lessons of the UDRP broadly, and section
VI concludes that a just and equitable system would share few qualities
with the UDRP.
II. ICANN AND THE UDRP
The Internet's domain name system is currently (since 1998) admin-
istered by ICANN, a private, not-for-profit corporation, under the author-
ity of a series of understandings with the U.S. Department of
Commerce. 18 One of ICANN's first assignments was to adopt a dispute
resolution policy to allow speedy and inexpensive resolution of conflicts
regarding rights to domain names. ICANN approved its Uniform Domain
Name Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP) 19 and Rules for Uniform
Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy20 on October 24, 1999, and they
went into effect on December 1, 1999. ICANN imposes this policy on
www.newsbytes.com/news/00/151438.html (quoting Mark Thurman of the
American Intellectual Property Law Association, who claimed the UDRP would "serve
as a good template for a broader dispute resolution apparatus"); Thomas H. Webster,
Domain Name Proceedings and International Dispute Resolution, 2001 Bus. L. INT'L 215;
Tim Cole, ICANN Domain Name Dispute Policy-Year One, METROPOLITAN CoRP. COUNS.,
Feb. 2001, at 31 (reporting that Assistant Director of National Arbitration Forum
applauds UDRP as "a model of dispute resolution for the 21st century").
18 See ICANN, APPROVED AGREEMENTS AMONG ICANN, THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
COMMERCE, AND NETWORK SOLUTIONS, INC., at http://www.icann.org.nsi/ nsi-
agreements.htm (posted Nov. 10, 1999). ICANN is pronounced EYE-can, as in "I can
at least try to manage the Internet." WHATis?cOM, at http://
www.whatis.techtarget.com (last updated Apr. 27, 2001). In a sense, ICANN is the
successor to the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA), which derived its
authority under a contract from the U.S. government which financed the original
research network, ARPANET, from which the Internet grew. The need to
internationalize the governing of the Internet led the U.S. government to
recommend the origin of ICANN as a global, nongovernmental entity. Id. For a fuller
account of the transfer of authority to ICANN, see A. Michael Froomkin, Wrong Turn
in Cyberspace: Using ICANN to Route Around the APA and the Constitution, 50 DUKE L.J. 17
(2000) [hereinafter Froomkin Wrong Turn]; Laura Pearlman, Truth, Justice and the
Dot-Com Wars, LAW NEWS NETWORK, Mar. 31 2000, at http://
www.lawnewsnetwork.com/practice/techlaw/news.
19 UDRP, supra note 16. For a thorough discussion of the evolution of proposals
to create a dispute resolution system for domain names through the adoption of the
ICANN Policy and ICANN Rules, see Laurence R. Helfer & Graeme B. Dinwoodie,
Designing Non-National Systems: The Case of the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution
Policy, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 141, 144-54 (2001).
20 ICANN RULES, supra note 16.
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approved domain name registrars, and through them onto all who
acquire domain names.
2 1
One can see the superficial appeal of an ICANN-like process to
resolve international Internet disputes. First, it applies globally; all dis-
putes about top level domain names ending in .com, .net, and .org are
subject to this policy, no matter where in the world the parties reside or
do business and no matter where the domain name holder registered the
domain. This eliminates the tricky issue of personal jurisdiction over the
domain name holder. It also manages to create a contractually-mandated
private system for the benefit of noncontracting parties. Second, because
the process does not require (or even allow) personal appearances by the
parties,2 2 it minimizes geographic distance problems. Parties need not
travel to participate in the process. Third, the UDRP attempts to over-
come the choice of law problems raised by differences in national trade-
mark laws by creating its own "law" in the ICANN Policy. Finally, because
ICANN has a contract with the company that controls the root server that
assigns domain names, it has the power to enforce the arbitrators' deci-
sions without the need to ask a court to enforce the judgment.
The ICANN Policy allows a trademark holder to submit a complaint
to any dispute resolution provider (DRP) approved by ICANN. 2 3 The
complainant must allege and convince the arbitrator that:
1. the domain name is identical or confusingly similar to a trade-
mark or service mark in which the complainant has rights; and
2. the domain name holder has no rights or legitimate interests in
respect of the domain name; and
21 Registrars are companies, which are licensed by ICANN, that have the power
to assign new domain names. Registrars must be accredited by ICANN, and they must
agree to abide by ICANN's rules. See ICANN, REGISTRATION ACCREDITATION, at http://
www.icann.org/registrars/ accreditation-process.htm (page updated July 26, 2001).
ICANN's rules require the registrars to incorporate the UDRP into the registration
agreements between the registrar and the domain name holders. Paragraph 1 of the
ICANN Policy informs domain name holders that the dispute resolution policy is
"incorporated by reference into your Registration Agreement." UDRP, supra note 16,
§1.
22 Pleadings are filed in hard copy and electronically, and attachments are
generally sent by mail.
23 There are currendy four approved DRPs: 1) World Intellectual Property
Organization (WIPO), 2) the National Arbitration Forum (NA), 3) eResolution
(eRes), and 4) CPR Institute for Dispute Resolution. See ICANN, APPROVED PROVIDERS
FOR UNIFORM DOMAIN NAME DISPUTE RESOLUTION, at http://www.icann.org/udrp/
approved-providers.htm (page updated Apr. 14, 2001) [hereinafter ICANN APPROVED
PROVIDERS]. Since this article was written, eResolution has folded its operation and
stopped accepting ICANN arbitration proceedings. It blames the pro-complainant
bias of WIPO coupled with the complainant's privilege to choose the DRP. See id.
(page updated Nov. 31, 2001). See also Press Release, eResolution (Nov. 31, 2001),
http://www.eresolution.com/default.htm; Kieren McCarthy, eResolution quits domain
arbitration, REGISTER, Dec. 4, 2001, at http:// theregister.co.uk/content/6/
23175.html.
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3. the domain name has been registered and is being used in bad
faith.
The Policy also provides a non-exhaustive list of circumstances that
are "evidence" of bad faith:
1. circumstances indicating that the domain name holder regis-
tered or acquired the domain name primarily for the purpose of
selling, renting, or otherwise transferring the domain name regis-
tration to the complainant who is the owner of the trademark or
service mark or to a competitor of that complainant, for valuable
consideration in excess of documented out-of-pocket costs directly
related to the domain name; or
2. the domain name was registered in order to prevent the owner
of the trademark or service mark from reflecting the mark in a
corresponding domain name, provided that the domain name
holder has engaged in a pattern of such conduct; or
3. the domain name was registered primarily for the purpose of
disrupting the business of a competitor; or
4. by using the domain name, the owner has intentionally
attempted to attract, for commercial gain, Internet users to its web
site or other on-line location, by creating a likelihood of confusion
with the complainant's mark as to the source, sponsorship, affilia-
tion, or endorsement of its web site or location or of a product or
service on its web site or location. 2 4
The domain name holder (the "respondent" under the ICANN pol-
icy) has three possible affirmative defenses (note, however, that their ele-
ments overlap considerably with the complainant's burden of proof):
1. before any notice of the dispute, the domain name holder used,
or made demonstrable preparations to use, the domain name or a
name corresponding to the domain name in connection with a
bona fide offer of goods or services; or
2. the domain name holder has been commonly known by the
domain name (even absent a trademark or service mark); or
3. the domain name holder is making a legitimate noncommercial
or fair use of the domain name, without intent for commercial
gain to misleadingly divert consumers or to tarnish the trademark
or service mark at issue.25
These standards involve the resolution of fact-intensive issues like
confusing similarity, bad faith, intent behind registration, fair use, and
whether conduct would tarnish a trademark or service mark. As various
arbitrators interpret the Policy, the question of whether a complainant
has met her burden also involves the question of whether the complain-
24 UDRP, supra note 16, §4.
25 Id. The ICANN Policy is similar to U.S. law, but it is not in fact the same as the
law of any actual country. For example, compare the Policy to the Anti-Cybersquatting
Consumer Protection Act (ACPA), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (2000). See Emerson H. Tiller,
ICAN's Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy: An Overview and Critique, 1
INTERNET L. & Bus. 589, 591-93 (2000) (listing some of the differences between the
UDRP and the ACPA).
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ant has established a nonregistered common law mark. Except in the
most blatant cybersquatting cases, the resolution of such fact-based dis-
putes should involve procedural devices such as discovery,2 6 live hearings,
and cross examination. 27 The main point of this policy, however, is that it
is fast and cheap. The complaint is filed in writing. It must describe the
manner in which the domain name is similar to the trademark, why the
domain name holder has no rights in the mark, and why the domain
names should be considered as registered and used in bad faith. The
complaining trademark owner must also attach documentary or other evi-
dence, including any trademark or service mark registration. 28 The com-
plainant pays the filing fee, which varies by DRP, the number of domain
names involved, and whether either party opts for a three-member panel.
Because this complaint will, in effect, form the basis for the decision, it
will probably contain more factual detail than "notice pleading" would
require.
2 9
26 As one trained in the U.S. procedural system, I use the term "discovery" to
refer to the system for gathering relevant information and bringing it to the attention
of the fact finder. Other systems use other methods that result in parties having access
to information formerly in the hands of their opponents, whether it be investigation
by the judge, document disclosure, pre-action protocols, or particularized fact
pleading. My argument here is not that the system needs to precisely replicate
American discovery methodology, but only that some mechanism for allowing
exchange of information is essential if the process will result in findings regarding
disputed facts.
27 The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), which drafted the
initial version of the UDRP, was asked to recommend whether the UDRP should be
expanded into other areas. In its Final Report on the subject, WIPO comments that in
more fact-intensive disputes the streamlined UDRP might not be adequate. WIPO,
THE RECOGNITION OF RIGHTS AND THE USE OF NAMES IN THE INTERNET DOMAIN NAME
SYSTEM (Sept. 3, 2001), 1 318(iii), at http://wipo2.wipo.int/process2/report/html/
report.html [hereinafter WIPO, THE RECOGNITION OF RIGHTS] ("The UDRP was
designed for ... straight-forward disputes .... It was not designed to accommodate
disputes involving interests on both sides, which requires a more extensive procedure,
perhaps involving the hearing of evidence and oral arguments.").
28 The DRP is allowed to impose page or word limits on the complaint, response,
and opinion. For example, CPR and NAF each impose a ten page limit on complaint
and response. CPR INSTITUTE FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION, CPR's SUPPLEMENTAL RULES
AND FEE SCHEDULE, paras. 4-5, at http://www.cpradr.org/ICANNRulesAndFees.htm
(last visited Nov. 7, 2001) (on file with the Journal of Small and Emerging Business
Law); NAT'L ARBITRATION FORUM, UNIFORM DOMAIN NAME DISPUTE RESOLUTION
POLICY "UDRP" SUPPLEMENTAL RULES (2001), at http://www.arbforum.com/
domains/UDRP/ rules.asp (Oct. 15, 2001). The parties can circumvent these limits,
however, by designating filings as attachments.
29 The legal fees involved would likely be more than required for merely drafting
a court complaint, but far less than would be required to litigate a preliminary
injunction request. It is possible, therefore, that a trademark owner who expects the
domain name holder to default would actually be better off filing a lawsuit in federal
court, where the filing fees would be less than the cost of the ICANN filing. Both
filing fees and the cost of preparing the initial document would be lower in federal
court. The Eastern District of Virginia, the federal district in which Network
Solutions, Inc. is located, has held that the act of registering the domain name is a
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The domain name holder/respondent must be notified within three
calendar days and has twenty days from the commencement of the pro-
ceeding to submit a response. That response should specifically address
the statements in the complaint as well as any applicable affirmative
defenses. If the respondent wants a three-member panel rather than a
single arbitrator, it must pay half the applicable fee.30 If the respondent
fails to respond, the case will be decided based on the complaint.3 1 The
arbitrator has the power to determine the admissibility, relevance, materi-
ality, and weight of the evidence, and may request further statements and
documents from the parties. The Rules provide that there "shall be no in-
person hearings (including hearings by teleconference, videoconference,
and web conference)" unless the arbitrator "determines, in its sole discre-
tion and as an exceptional matter, that such a hearing is necessary for
deciding the complaint."3 2 The arbitrator is directed to forward a deci-
sion on the complaint to the DRP within fourteen days of his appoint-
ment. The decision should be in writing and provide the reasons on
which it is based. If the arbitrator rules for the complainant, ICANN will
require the cancellation of the domain name or its transfer to the corn-
sufficient basis for establishing specific personal jurisdiction there in a suit under the
Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d). Lucent Techs.,
Inc. v. Lucentsucks.com, 95 F. Supp. 2d 528 (E.D. Va. 2000). But see AOL, Inc. v.
Huang, 106 F. Supp. 2d 848 (E.D. Va. 2000). Even if the defendant unexpectedly
answers, the Eastern District is the home of the "rocket docket" which emphasizes
limited discovery and early trial settings. The ACPA also has an in rem provision that
has been upheld by some courts. See, e.g., BroadBridge Media, L.L.C. v. Hypercd.com,
106 F. Supp. 2d 505 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); Heathmount A.E. Corp. v. Technodome.com,
106 F. Supp. 2d 860 (E.D. Va. 2000).
so The fees vary by provider, and vary according to the number of domain names
in dispute, but the total fee for multiple panelists would be between $2,500 and
$6,000 for most cases. See, e.g., CPR INSTITUTE FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION, supra note 28,
para. 13; ERESOLUTION, SCHEDULE OF FEES, at http://www.eresolution.ca/services/
dnd/schedule.htm (last modified Oct. 15, 2001); NAT'L ARBITRATION FORUM, supra
note 28, § 16; WIPO, SCHEDULE OF FEES UNDER THE ICANN POLICY (Aug. 15, 2000), at
http://www.arbiter.wipo.int/domains/fees/index.html. When a three-member panel
is used, the complainant and respondent each propose three potential panelists (the
DRP chooses among them if available), and the DRP chooses the third after soliciting
reactions to a list of five potential panelists. ICANN RULES, supra note 16, §§ 3(b),
5(b) (v), 6(e). ICANN refers to even a single decisionmaker as a "panelist." I have
used the word "arbitrator" instead so as not to imply that a "panel" composed of
multiple persons exists.
11 Some decisions have indicated that failure to respond is proof of bad faith. See,
e.g., AFC Enters. v. Max Mktg., Case No. D2000-0975 (WIPO Oct. 12, 2000) (Lisman,
Arb.), at http://www.arbiter.wipo.int/domains/ decisions; Mars, Inc. v. Vanilla, Ltd.,
Case No. D2000-0586 (WIPO Sept. 1, 2000) (Partridge, Panelist), at http://
arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions; Ty, Inc. v. O.Z. Names, Case No. D2000-0370
(WIPO June 27, 2000) (Abel, Panelist), at http://www.arbiter.wipo.int/domains/
decisions; Suntex Int'l, Inc. v. 24game, Case No. D2000-0408 (WIPO June 26, 2000)
(Methvin, Panelist), at http://www.arbiter.wipo.int.domains/decisions.
12 ICANN RULES, supra note 16, § 13.
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plainant.3 3 The only way for the domain name holder to prevent the can-
cellation or transfer is to file a lawsuit against the trademark owner and
provide a file-stamped copy of the complaint to ICANN within ten busi-
ness days.34 There is no internal appeal. The whole process should thus
be resolved in less than two months.
The original purpose of the ICANN dispute resolution process was to
create a remedy for a narrowly defined group of particularly egregious
cases. During the initial drafting process, the procedure was said to be
available "only in respect of deliberate, bad faith, abusive, domain name
registrations or 'cybersquatting."13 5 ICANN's staff repeated this promise
after receiving public comments on the proposed policy. They assured
concerned commentators that "the policy... calls for administrative reso-
lution for only a small, special class of disputes," namely those "involving
'abusive registrations' made with bad faith intent to profit commercially
from others' trademarks."3 6 Nevertheless, the dispute resolution proce-
dure has been used in all sorts of trademark/domain name disputes.
Between December 1, 1999 and July 31, 2001, ICANN disposed of 3,316
domain name disputes by decision, involving 5,975 domain names. Of
these dispositions, only about 19% were decided in favor of the domain
name holder. 37 The rest resulted in transferring the domain name to the
trademark owner (2,616), canceling the domain name (28), both cancel-
ing and transferring the challenged names (1), or in a split decision
(21).38
3 No provisions exist for money damages.
34 The lawsuit must be filed in a "mutual jurisdiction," which will generally be
either the location of the domain name registrar's principal office or the domain
name holder's residence as shown in the registrar's Whois database at the time the
complaint is filed. UDRP, supra note 16, § 4(k); ICANN RuLEs, supra note 16, §§ 1,
3(xiii).
31 WIPO, THE MANAGEMENT OF INTERNET NAMES AND ADDRESSES: INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY ISSUES § 135(i) (Apr. 30, 1999), at http:// wipo2.wipo.int/processl/report/
finalreport.html [hereinafter WIPO, MANAGEMENT OF INTERNET NAMES]. See also NAT'L
TELECOMMS. & INFO. ADMIN., DEP'T OF COMMERCE, MANAGEMENT OF INTERNET NAMES
AND ADDRESSES, June 10, 1998, 1998 WL 298883 (F.R.)
([Wihatever dispute resolution mechanism is put in place by the new
corporation, that mechanism should be directed toward disputes about
cybersquatting and cyberpiracy and not to settling the disputes between two
parties with legitimate competing interests in a particular mark. Where legitimate
competing rights are concerned, disputes are rightly settled in an appropriate
court.)
36 ICANN, SECOND STAFF REPORT ON IMPLEMENTATION DOCUMENTS FOR THE
UNIFORM DISPUTE RESOLUTION POLICY § 4.1(c) (Oct. 24, 1999), at http://
www.icann.org/udrp/udrp-second-staff-report-24oct99.htm.
37 ICANN, STATISTICAL SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS UNDER UNIFORM DOMAIN NAME
DISPUTE RESOLUTION POLICY, at http://www.icann.org/udrp/ proceedings-stat.htm
(page updated Nov. 6, 2001). Conversely, one could say that 79.76% of the
proceedings were resolved wholly in favor of the complainant, with some additional
victories included in the split decisions.
38 Id.
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The ICANN process is mandatory in the sense that once a complaint
is filed it will be processed by the dispute resolution provider unless the
complaint is settled or withdrawn. If the domain name holder does not
respond to the complaint, she will almost certainly lose, and ICANN will
order her domain name transferred or canceled.
The ICANN process is not mandatory in the sense that the rules do
not preclude the filing of a lawsuit, either during the proceeding 39 or
after its conclusion. A trademark owner who believes that, given the par-
ticular circumstances, a federal lawsuit would be more advantageous is
free to pursue that option instead of, or in addition to, the ICANN
procedure. 40
It should be clear from the above description that the UDRP's opera-
tion is essentially a private process. ICANN itself is a private, nonprofit
corporation whose policies are shaped both by governments and by influ-
ential private entities. ICANN has needed and still needs "the concur-
rence of every powerful party with an interest in domain name policy."4 1
39 The arbitrator has the discretion to stay the ICANN proceeding (or not)
during the pendency of court litigation. UDRP, supra note 16, § 18(a). It is unsettled
at this time whether ICANN decisions will receive some degree of deference in any
related litigation. See, e.g., Weber-Stephen Prods. v. Armitage Hardware & Bldg.
Supply Inc., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d 1766 (N.D. Ill. 2000); Weber-Stephen Prods. v. Armitage
Hardware, Case No. D2000-0187 (WIPO May 11, 2000) (Powers, Panelist), at http://
www.arbiter.wipo.int/ domains/decisions. In U.S. courts, at least, a tradition of
deference does not seem to be developing. For example, in Parisi v. Netlearning, Inc.,
139 F. Supp. 2d 745, 752 (E.D. Va. 2001), the court refused to apply the deferential
review standards of the Federal Arbitration Act to the UDRP decision. In another
case, the district court ruled differently from the prior UDRP decision between the
same parties without citing that decision or explaining why it disagreed with the
arbitrator. Compare Referee Enters., Inc. v. Planet Ref, Inc., Case No. 00-C-1391 (E.D.
Wis. Jan. 24, 2001), at http://www.Loundy.com/cases, with Referee Enters. v. Planet
Ref, Inc., File No. FA0004000094707 (NAF June 26, 2000) (Kupferman, Arb.), at
http://www.arbforum.com/domains/decisions.
I It appears that a domain name holder who loses an ICANN proceeding can
successfully invoke the jurisdiction of a U.S. federal court to secure a judicial
determination of its rights. See Sallen v. Corinthians Licenciamentos LTDA, No. 01-
1197, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 25965 (1st Cir. Dec 5, 2001) (finding federal jurisdiction
under ACPA). See also Plaintiffs Complaint, Barcelona.com v. Excelentisimo
Ayuntamiento de Barcelona (E.D. Va. Filed Aug. 17, 2000) (complaint contesting
UDRP decision regarding barcelona.com brought under § 1114(2) of the ACPA),
http://www.domainbattles.com/lawsuit3.htm. 15 U.S.C. § 1114(2) (D) (v) creates a
civil cause of action for domain name registrants whose registrations are cancelled or
transferred.
41 Jonathan Zittrain, ICANN: Between the Public and the Private Comments Before
Congress, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1071, 1083 (1999). WIPO, the original drafter of the
UDRP and largest processor of domain name disputes, has also been accused of being
captive to corporate interests.
What we're looking at here is a coup by WIPO over every other body set up to
resolve Internet argy-bargy. And how do you run a coup? You get either military
[or] the money-makers on your side. Seeing as there isn't any Internet military, it
has gone for the fat and rich corporations.
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In addition to governments (especially the U.S. and the European
Union), this "concurrence" includes Internet engineering groups and
trademark interests. 42 ICANN "faces swift dispatch if it strays too far from
the desires of ... powerful corporate interests."43 ICANN developed its
domain name dispute policy and the rules for implementing it with the
input of these key groups. 4 4 The following sections analyze how fairly this
privatized dispute resolution system solves the problems of Internet
uncertainty.
III. SUCCESSES: WHAT ICANN DOES RIGHT
At a level of platitudes, there is general consensus about the require-
ments for a fair and effective system of dispute resolution. 45 For example,
the Center for Law, Commerce & Technology lists independence, low
cost, transparency, adversarial procedure, representation, legality, and
liberty as the essential elements of an ODR scheme. 46 The Better Business
Bureau system has a similar list: fairness, visibility, accessibility, timeliness,
finality, and enforcement.47 The UDRP has elements that satisfy some of
these requirements.
Kieren McCarthy, Who the hell does WIPO think it is?, REGISTER, Aug. 16, 2000, at http://
www.theregister.co.uk/content/5/12638.html.
42 Zittrain, supra note 41, at 1083.
43 Id. at 1091.
1 The initial version of the policy was actually developed by WIPO. A number of
governments have recently appealed to WIPO to consider amending the domain
name system to handle issues such as famous names, geographic locations, and "un-
trademarked" trade names. See Michael Geist, WIPO Wipes Out Domain Name Rights,
GLOBE & MAIL, Aug. 24, 2000, at http://www.globetechnology.com/archive
[hereinafter Geist, WIPO Wipes Out Rights]. While WIPO's interim report leaned in
favor of expanding the UDRP to geographical, personal, and trade names, the final
report concedes that the lack of international consensus on applicable law would
make such an expansion inappropriate. WIPO, MANAGEMENT OF INTERNET NAMES,
supra note 35, 1 65-76. However, ignoring this correctly limited approach, ICANN at
its recent meeting in Montevideo voted to give countries exclusive rights to country
names in the new .info TLD. See ICANN, PRELIMINARY REPORT, MEETING OF THE
ICANN BOARD IN MONTEVIDEO (Sept. 10, 2001), at http://www.icann.org/minutes/
prelim-report- 10sep01.htm.
41 Most of the discussion of ODR has been in the context of business-to-
consumer (B2C) commercial transactions. The implementation of the standards on
the list would undoubtedly have to be modified for other kinds of Internet-related
disputes.
46 CENTER FOR LAW, COMMERCE & TECHNOLOGY, UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON
SCHOOL OF LAW, ONLINE ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: AN ISSUES PRIMER 19
(2000), at http://www.law.washington.edu/lct/publications.html (prepared for the
National Association of Attorneys General). See also Commission Recommendation on
the Principles Applicable to the Bodies Responsible for Out-of-Court Settlement of
Consumer Disputes, Commission Report 98/257, at 31 (Apr. 17, 1998), at http://
europea.eu.int/comm.consumers/policy/developments (listing independence,
transparency, adversarial principle, effectiveness, legality, liberty, and representation).
4 COUNCIL OF BETTER BUSINESS BUREAUS, INC. & BBBONLINE, PROTECTING
CONSUMERS IN CROss-BORDER TRANSACTIONS: A COMPREHENSIVE MODEL FOR
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The UDRP allocates most of the administrative cost of a proceeding
to the complaining trademark holder.48 This is most likely to be the party
with greater resources. Although the cost will be at least $950, the com-
mercial value of a domain name can be so substantial that the administra-
tive cost are likely proportional to the value in controversy from the
perspective of a complaining trademark holder. The UDRP does not
require the parties to hire attorneys to prepare the complaint and
response, and doing so would add to the cost of pursuing or defending
the proceeding. 49 In all but default proceedings, however, the limited
nature of the UDRP process is likely to require less attorney time than a
conventional lawsuit.50 Even though the DRP's fees have already
increased by at least 50% in the short time the policy has been in opera-
tion, it is still regarded as a bargain by trademark holders. 5 1
The UDRP also succeeds in being a process that resolves disputes
quickly. Most of the cases are disposed of within the allotted times, which
are themselves very short. The ability to transmit information electroni-
cally undoubtedly adds to the speed of the process. While the process
achieves speed by allowing very little input and by limiting the issues
involved, it must be said that speed was the drafters' primary goal and it
ALTERNATvE DISUTE RESOLUTION (2000), at http://www.bbbonline.org/ about/
press/whitepaper.doc.
" UDRP, supra note 16, § 4(g) (complainant pays filing fees, except that
respondent pays half the fees if respondent requests three member panel). However,
the cost of half-fees for a three-member panel may deter respondents from requesting
this more reliable procedure. In addition, some of the DRPs-by supplemental rule-
impose additional fees that might have to be paid by respondent. For example, some
DRPs charge extra if the party wants to receive communication by fax or courier
rather than by email. See EREsOLUTION, supra note 30 ($100 for fax, $250 for courier).
NAF charges a filing fee for respondents to request an extension of time ($100) or
when either party requests the opportunity to submit additional written statements or
documents ($250). NAT'L ARBITRATION FORUM, supra note 28, §§ 6(a) (v), 7(b) (ii).
4" "Complainants are usually companies who are represented either by in-house
or external trademark counsel. The respondents are frequently unrepresented,
although one does come across cases where corporate respondents use trademark
counsel." Webster, supra note 17, at 227. The theoretical benefit of not requiring
attorneys may disadvantage respondents in practice, if their pro se defense is
overpowered by a lawyer-drafted complaint.
50 Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Going Private: Technology, Due Process, and Internet
Dispute Resolution, 34 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 151, 163 n.43 (2000) (comparing cost of
UDRP filing with default judgment case in U.S. federal court).
51 Commentators have noted that the fees paid to UDRP arbitrators are modest
in comparison with what they could otherwise make as practicing attorneys or in
deciding more conventional arbitral matters. See, e.g., Heifer & Dinwoodie, supra note
19, at 231. Since this article was written, NAF raised its fees in cases involving one to
five disputed domain names. See NAT'L ARBITRATION FORUM, UDRP SCHEDULE OF
FEES, http://www.arbitration-forum.com/domains/UDRP/feesl.asp (last visited Jan.
26, 2002) (new fees); http://www.arbitration-forum.com/domains/UDRP/fees.asp
(old fees).
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was successfully accomplished. 52 Note, however, that this speed is far
more likely to benefit the complainant than the respondent.
The ICANN process is also transparent in some respects. First, both
the substantive 53 and the procedural provisions of the UDRP are posted
on the ICANN web site and are easily accessible. 54 Second, any arbitrator
deciding an individual case must render the decision in writing, and the
decision must explain the reasons for the result.55 Third, those decisions
are usually made publicly available; they are posted on the DRP's websites
and indexed by party and commencement date. 56 Thus anyone who has
52 The speed can be used to add further disadvantage to respondents. Under the
ICANN Rules, the proceeding is commenced when the DRP forwards the complaint
to respondent. ICANN RULES, supra note 16, § 4(c). This transmission is done by e-
mail and by hard copy, but the attachments (which are in hard copy) are generally
sent by snail mail. Id. § 2(a). Respondent has only twenty days from
"commencement," however, to submit a response. Id. § 5(a). Given the global
coverage of the UDRP, a respondent might not have received the attachments before
the response deadline runs, and will certainly receive less than the apparent twenty
days. If significant information is contained in the attachment but not in the actual
complaint, this combination of rules exacerbates the parties' unequal benefit from
the speed of process.
51 The written policy introduces elements of uncertainty, however, because
paragraph 15 of the ICANN Policy (UDRP) directs the arbitrator to decide the
complaint based not only on the UDRP itself, but also on "any rules and principles of
law that it deems applicable." UDRP, supra note 16, § 15(a).
5' The ICANN website also provides links to the Supplemental Rules of the
approved DRPs. ICANN APPROVED PROVIDERS, supra note 23.
'5 UDRP, supra note 16, § 15(d). This provision is sometimes described as a
requirement of arbitral due process. See AM. ARBITRATION ASS'N, CONSUMER DUE
PROCESS PROTOCOL: STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES OF THE NATIONAL CONSUMER DISPUTES
ADVISORY COMMITTEE, http://www.adr.org/education/education/consumerprotocol.
HTML (LAST VISITED Nov. 7, 2001) (PROVIDING THAT "[A]r THE TIMELY REQUEST OF
EITHER PARTY, THE ARBITRATOR SHOULD PROVIDE A BRIEF WRITrEN EXPLANATION OF THE
BASIS FOR THE AWARD"); see also Richard C. Reuben, Constitutional Gravity: A Unitary
Theoiy of Alternative Dispute Resolution and Public Civil Justice, 47 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 949,
1085 (2000) (explaining that written opinions make the process more democratic,
enhance the integrity and legitimacy of the process, provide rationality and trans-
parency in an otherwise arbitrary process, perform a persuasive and educational func-
tion, and can coalesce into a collective arbitral wisdom).
16 Because the volume of UDRP decisions has reached into the thousands, the
decisions are not practically useful or meaningfully transparent in the absence of an
indexing system or thoroughly searchable database. Such systems are in development.
The Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard has created a search engine
that allows some searching of the database of decisions. See ICANN, SEARCH DECISIONS
IN PROCEEDINGS UNDER THE UNIFORM DOMAIN NAME DISPUTE RESOLUTION POLICY, at
http://www.icann.org/udrp/udrpdec.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2001). Professor
Michael Geist of the University of Ottawa has created a database of ICANN decisions
searchable for information about panelists' participation. See UDRPINFo.coM, at
http://www.udrpinfo.com (last visited Nov. 7, 2001). As the volume of UDRP
decisions grows ever larger, a better system of indexing will be necessary to perform
searches such as finding cases deciding particular issues. The UDRP Publishing
Protocol Project, in response to this dilemma, is attempting to develop more uniform
reporting standards. See UDRP PUBLISHING PROTOCOL PROJECT, at http://
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the time and energy can read the opinions and personally assess whether
the arbitrator has correctly applied the ICANN Policy to the facts as
described. 57 It also allows the general public to watch for any troubling
patterns of behavior by complainants, respondents, or the DRPs. 58 Absent
the public availability of the decisions, the problems discussed herein
would still exist but would be unknown.
One of the thorniest problems of ODR is making its decisions
enforceable. 59 A compliant party called upon to perform presents no pro-
cedural difficulty. However, either a party who has second thoughts about
a mediation agreement, or a party who loses a binding arbitration
scheme, may not comply. In this case, the party entitled to performance
would have to bring a court action to enforce the agreement, 60 thus reviv-
ing many of the legal and practical obstacles discussed in Section I.
udrp.law.cornell.edu/udrp (last modified Nov. 15, 2001). Note, however, that it is
universities and foundations rather than ICANN itself that are providing this more
effective transparency.
5' Because the decisions often seem to be selectively quoting allegations rather
than finding facts, ICANN should also post the parties' pleadings and supporting
documents. If these documents revealed trade secrets or proprietary information,
they could be redacted. This practice would shed more light on the ways in which
arbitrators are actually applying the UDRP.
" For example, critics have noted the following: WIPO arbitrators' tendency to
favor trademark owners (Laurence R. Helfer, International Dispute Settlement at the
Trademark-Domain Name Interface, 29 PEPP. L. REv. (forthcoming 2001) (manuscript on
file with the Journal of Small and Emerging Business Law)); a pattern of decisions
that (at least by U.S. standards) undervalue free speech interests (Dori Kornfeld,
Comment, Evaluating the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, at http://
cyber.law.harvard.edu/icann/pressingissues2000/briefingbook/udrp-review.html
(last updated Oct. 31, 2000)); decisions that conflict in their interpretations of the
ICANN Policy (UDRP) or Rules (Robert A. Badgley, Improving ICANN in Ten Easy
Steps: Ten Suggestions for ICANN to Improve its Anti-Cybersquatting Arbitration System, 2000
J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 109, 113-14 (2000)); and decisions that conflict with the policy as
written (Ian L. Stewart, The Best Laid Plans: How Unrestrained Arbitration Decisions Have
Corrupted the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, 53 FED. COMM. LJ. 509, 510
(2001)).
59 TASK FORCE ON E-COMMERCE & ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION, AM. BAR
Ass'N, DRAFT PRELIMINARY REPORT & CONCEPT PAPER 4 (May 2001), http://
www.law.washington.edu/ABA-eADR/drafts/2001.05.2/draft.html ("One of the
largest concerns with respect to ODR is the existence of means for enforcing
outcomes. In many cases, the link between ODR and effective enforcement
mechanisms remains unclear .... Without effective enforcement, the vitality of ODR
may be severely hindered."); Brandon Mitchener, Cybercourts Emerge as Way to Resolve
Internet Disputes, WALL ST. J., Mar. 21, 2000, http://interactive.wsj.com/articles/SB9
("Arbitration experts say the ability to enforce decisions will be the acid test for any
online dispute-settlement systems.").
60 Under certain circumstances, international arbitral awards may be enforceable
under the New York Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral
Awards. In the United States, federal courts are given a broad grant ofjurisdiction to
enforce these awards. 9 U.S.C. § 201 (2000). There are certain obstacles, however, to
using the New York Convention to enforce online arbitral awards. For a discussion of
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ICANN has largely succeeded in solving the enforcement dilemma,
although it is not a solution that could easily be replicated in a different
context. Because ICANN has a contract with Network Solutions, Inc.,
which controls the computer that physically assigns each domain name, it
can itself enforce the UDRP decision. A winning complainant will either
be awarded the domain name at issue or the name will be cancelled.
Either way, the respondent will no longer be able to use it. This will not
be true if the respondent files a lawsuit within ten days of ICANN's
receipt of notice of the arbitrator's decision. 61 However, so far only about
twenty-five cases have been filed "appealing" the UDRP decision,62 leav-
ing others effectively final. The process is therefore largely successful in
providing the participants with a final and enforceable result.
In summary, ICANN adopted a process that succeeds in some ways,
especially from the standpoint of trademark holders. It is well tailored to
meet the primary goal of providing a fast, low-cost remedy. The UDRP
also achieves some level of transparency of rules and results. Unfortu-
nately, there are other ways in which the ICANN process falls far short of
due process ideals. The next section of the article explores these
concerns.
IV. FAILURES: PROBLEMS OF LEGITIMACY AND FAIRNESS
ICANN's successes have been accompanied by the kinds of problems
that one might expect in a privatized process. Anyone considering using
the UDRP as a model for resolving other kinds of Internet disputes must
pay heed to these failures as well. The lessons include the questionable
legitimacy of privately-adopted substantive standards, the danger of
unprincipled "choice of law" decisions to fill in the gaps in that private
law, unreconciled splits among arbitrators as to the meaning of the stan-
dards, and a tendency to expand beyond the narrow 'jurisdictional" lim-
its of the policy. The UDRP also demonstrates that procedural choices
can exacerbate substantive ones when private processes are imposed with-
out true consent, when procedural rules unevenly impact the parties, and
when procedures designed primarily to be fast are allowed to frustrate
other due process values.
these, see M. Scott Donahey, Current Developments in Online Dispute Resolution, 16J. INT'L
ARB. 115 (1999).
61 UDRP, supra note 16, § 4(k).
62 There is no systematic record tracking such cases. ICANN would receive the
notices, and therefore would be in the best position to provide information about the
filings, but this information is not available on its web site. The Uniform Domain
Name Dispute Resolution Policy Legal Information Site has attempted to compile as
complete a list as possible. See UDRPLAW.NET, COMPLETE LIST OF UDRP CHALLENGES IN
COURT, at http://www.udrplaw.net/UDRPappeals.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2001).
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A. Lessons About Creating Law
It is understandably frustrating to work in an environment in which
multiple, possibly inconsistent laws may apply. It is also understandable
that an industry faced with this dilemma would simultaneously try to min-
imize the uncertainty and nudge the law in its favor. Nevertheless, the
fact that the desire of trademark holders is understandable provides "no
policy reason why we should design the architecture of the system to assist
them."63 ICANN's creation of its own international trademark law64 is
inherently controversial. What right does a California nonprofit corpora-
tion have to create and impose law that differs from the law of nation-
states?
65
National interests have a role to play in the development of inter-
national solutions. Passing over them too quickly disserves a truly
international solution by ignoring helpful laboratories of laws, fail-
ing to take advantage of developed democratic political structures
that nation states (on the whole) provide, and ignoring the legiti-
mate claims of nation states to (partial) legislative competence. 66
ICANN is a particularly problematic example because many believe
that its formation and subsequent policies suffered from the over-influ-
ence of trademark holders, thus skewing the substantive and procedural
rules in their favor.6 7 Similarly, the recent appointment of a task force to
65 Jessica Litman, The DNS Wars: Trademarks and the Internet Domain Name System, 4
J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 149, 157 (2000).
64 David G. Post, Why Juries Should Play a Role in the Institutions that Govern
Cyberspace-Part I, FINDLAW'S COMMENTARY, Oct. 27, 2000, at http://
writ.news.findlaw.com/commentary/200/027_post.html (explaining that the UDRP
is, in effect, law).
65 "As the European Commission has soberly noted: 'ICANN . . . [is] taking
decisions of a kind that governments would, in other contexts, expect to take
themselves in the frameworks of international organisations.'" Andrew Orlowski,
ICANN Special: The Triangulations of Esther Dyson, REGISTER, at http://
www.theregister.co.uk/content/6/ 13061.html (posted Sept. 6, 2000) (on file with
the Journal of Small & Emerging Business Law). Cf Jay P. Kesan & Rajiv C. Shah, Fool
Us Once Shame on You - Fool Us Twice Shame on Us: What We Can Learn from the
Privatizations of the Internet Backbone Network and the Domain Name System, 79 WASH. U.
L.Q. 89 (2001) (discussing how privatization led to self-dealing and poor design
choices).
66 Graeme B. Dinwoodie, (National) Trademark Laws and the (Non-National) Domain
Name System, 21 U. PA. J. INT'L EcoN. L. 495, 510 (2000).
67 See Milton Mueller, ICANN and Internet Governance, 1 INFo. 497 (1999), http://
www.icannwatch.org/archives/muell.pdf (on file with the Journal of Small &
Emerging Business Law); Froomkin on Governance, supra note 8, at 628
([T]here can be little debate that the public participation in the process has been
dominated by intellectual property rights holders and their lawyers and trade
associations. Similarly, the [WIPO] Secretariat staff appear to be very sincerely
committed to WIPO's mission of the promotion of intellectual property rights -
so much so that to even think about 'capture' almost seems beside the point.);
Helfer, supra note 58 (noting that the UDRP's formation was "unduly rushed and
heavily dominated by intellectual property interests"); Helfer & Dinwoodie, supra
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study the UDRP has been criticized as similarly stacked in favor of intel-
lectual property interests and existing dispute resolution providers. 68 A
recent internal study of ICANN governance has recommended decreas-
ing the number of at-large board members (who represent the online
public), which has prompted further questions about ICANN's
legitimacy.69
If the various national laws were already fairly uniform, creating pri-
vate law that assimilates them would be relatively nonproblematic. That is
undoubtedly the reason that the ICANN Policy as written is mostly con-
fined to cases of blatant cybersquatting. 70 Considerable multinational dif-
ferences, however, exist in the law governing trademarks and their
attendant rights, as well as differences in the treatment of speech. 7 1 Just
as these differences have undermined ICANN's claim to legitimacy in the
domain name area, similar differences in national laws on consumer pro-
tection, antitrust, defamation, freedom of expression, advertising, trade
disparagement, products liability, privacy, and other areas would be cause
for concern if a non-national body attempted to create Internet law in
those areas. Some of these topics would be especially questionable as they
are generally considered to be "mandatory law"-those areas in which the
underlying social policy is so strong that parties may not contract around
it through choice of law clauses or the like. 72
note 19, at 178 (discussing critiques of ICANN's authority and the process resulting in
the UDRP).
" Names Council Selects UDRP Task Force Members, ICANN WATCH (2001), at http:/
/www.icannwatch.org/arataicle/php?sid=317.
69 AT-LARGE MEMBERSHIP STUDY COMMITTEE, ICANN, DRAr REPORT ON ICANN
AT LARGE MEMBERSHIP (2001), at http://www.atlargestudy.org/ draft final.shtml
(recommending decreasing number of at-large directors from nine to five). See David
McGuire, ICANN Board Member Blasts Governance Study, NEWSBYrEs, Aug. 29, 2001, at
http:// www.washtech.com/news/netarch/12205-1.html (reporting reactions to
report). In contrast, the NGO and Academic ICANN Study (NAIS) final report calls
for an open, at-large membership with strong participation in policy matters and
representation on the ICANN board equal to the total number of directors selected
by supporting organizations. NGO & ACADEMIC ICANN STUDY, ICANN, LEGITIMACY,
AND THE PUBLIC VOICE: MAKING GLOBAL PARTICIPATION AND REPRESENTATION WORK
(2001), at http:// www.naisproject.org/report/final. See also Letter from Barbara
Simons et. al. to ICANN (Mar. 8, 2001), at http://www.icannwatch.org/essays/
adarge.htm (expressing concern about possible ICANN plan to eliminate at-large
membership). For an informative discussion of the issues presented by the
Department of Commerce delegation of power to ICANN, see generally Froomkin
Wrong Turn, supra note 18, at 50-90; see also Jonathon Weinberg, ICANN and the
Problem of Legitimacy, 50 DUKE L.J. 187 (2000).
70 According to the Final Report of the second WIPO Internet Domain Name
Process, the UDRP "does not seek to regulate the whole universe of interface between
trademarks and domain name, but only to implement the lowest common
denominator of internationally agreed and accepted principles concerning the abuse
of trademarks." WIPO, THE RECOGNITION OP RIGHTS, supra note 27, 66.
71 Dinwoodie, supra note 66, at 500-01, 508, 551.
72 Thornburg, supra note 50, at 213; Richard Shell, Contracts in the Modern Supreme
Court, 81 CAL. L. REv. 431, 444 (1993) (discussing mandatory law as "market
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Even if one overlooks the democratic deficit and accepts ICANN's
authority to make law, the policy also allows the arbitrators to apply "any
rules and principles of law ... deem[ed] applicable. '73 While this may
seem like an innocent gap-filler, it has resulted in eclectic and unprinci-
pled "choice of law" decisions as different arbitrators choose to apply vari-
ous national laws 74 or "principles of equity." 75 This re-introduces the
uncertainty about applicable law that the UDRP was created to prevent. It
also exacerbates the differences among the decisions made by the unap-
pealable arbitrators, who not only interpret the Policy but also choose
when and how to supplement it with national law with virtually no gui-
dance from the ICANN Rules. 76 This apparent need to consult national
law, and, hence, the need for choice of law rules, may be a byproduct of
trying to create enforceable private law in areas where national laws differ
significantly. Any expansion of a UDRP-like process into areas with even
greater international variation would cause even greater problems of this
kind.77
inalienable"); see Stephen J. Ware, Default Rules from Mandatory Rules: Privatizing Law
Through Arbitration, 83 MINN. L. REv. 703 (1999).
73 UDRP, supra note 16, § 15(a).
7' According to King, as early as May 2000, UDRP panels had used precedent
and law outside the ICANN Policy and Rules at least 43 times. Stacey H. King, The
"Law That It Deems Applicable" ICANN, Dispute Resolution, and the Problem of
Cybersquatting, 22 HASTINGS COMM. & Er. L.J. 453, 484 n.139 (2000). One panelist
applied U.S. trademark law to a dispute brought by a New Zealand company with
offices in London, involving registration in Australia by an Australian citizen, on the
basis that the panelist was "reasonably familiar with U.S. trademark law." Kornfeld,
supra note 58, at 8, citing Tourism and Corporate Automation Ltd. v. TSI Ltd., Case
No. AF-0096 (eRes Mar. 16, 2000) (Hardy, Panelist), at http://www.eresolution.ca/
services/dnd/decisions (commenting that "it is not feasible for any given arbitrator or
panel to be familiar with all bodies of trademark and unfair trade law in all countries
reached by the Internet").
15 Thomas & Betts Int'l v. Power Cabling, Case No. AF-0274 (eRes Oct. 23, 2000)
(Greenwood, Panelist), at http://www.eresolution.ca/services/ dnd/decisions.
71 Supplementing the UDRP with national law can even taint the development of
the "law" of ICANN as cases cite each other. For example, Case 1 might resolve an
issue by applying one country's trademark law. Then, Case 2 cites Case 1 as an
interpretation of the UDRP, regardless of whether the same national law would apply
to the parties before it. See, e.g., Telestra Corp. v. Nuclear Marshmallows, Case No.
D2000-0003 (WIPO Feb. 18, 2000) (Christie, Panelist), at http://arbiter.wipo.int/
domains/ decisions (citing as precedent an earlier case applying U.S. law in a case
where both parties are Australian).
77 WIPO chose not to recommend expanding the UDRP to personal names,
geographical names, and unregistered trade names partly because doing so would
require extensive choice of law decisions. See WIPO, THE RECOGNITION OF RIGHTS,
supra note 27, 11 243, 318. Ironically, the report defends rather than disavowing
existing WIPO decisions under the UDRP that apply national law to find protection
for unregistered famous names. Id. 1 182-84. Even cases cited in Annex V to the
Report demonstrate that UDRP arbitrators have sometimes simply applied previous
ICANN decisions, regardless of the nationality of the parties. See, e.g., Rosa Montero
Gallo v. Galileo Asesores S.I., Case No. D2000-1649 (WIPO Jan. 27, 2001) (Mill6,
Panelista) (Sp.) at http://www.arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions (citing earlier
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This problem could be minimized by allowing privatized, interna-
tional rulemaking only in areas in which the international community has
reached sufficient unanimity that resort to national law is not required.
Otherwise, whether in the guise of creating substantive law or choice of
law rules, the privatized body and its adjudicators would be making the
kind of decisions better suited to democratic governments. Individual
UDRP arbitrators should not be creating law by choosing or amalgamat-
ing possible national approaches.
Even when the Policy itself seems to cover the issue involved in a
proceeding, different arbitrators interpret it differently. From a procedu-
ral perspective, for example, there are conflicting decisions about the
effect of the respondent's default and about whether an arbitrator may
allow a supplemental pleading that the arbitrator has not specifically
requested. 7 8 Substantively, there are also numerous split opinions con-
cerning what constitutes a violation of the ICANN Policy. 79 Because
ICANN decisions based on U.S. and U.K. law (if any), in a case involving parties who
were both from Spain); Cho Yong Pil v. ImageLand, Inc., Case No. D2000-0229
(WIPO May 10, 2000) (Kim, Panelist), at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/
decisions.html (applying an earlier ICANN decision that involved company names
and probably applied the law of India to a dispute about the name of a Korean pop
star). A decision to leave "famous name" cases outside the UDRP would be more
consistent with its drafting history and with WIPO, THE RECOGNIrION OF RIGHTS, supra
note 27, and would avoid the need to deal with conflicting national laws.
78 Badgley, supra note 58, at 113-14.
7 Winterson v. Hogarth, Case No. D2000-0235 (WIPO Mar. 22, 2000) (Perkins,
Panelist), at http://www.arbiter.wipo/int/domains/decisions (protecting "famous"
name); Sumner v. Urvan, Case No. D2000-0596 (WIPO July 24, 2000) (Christie,
Panelist), at http://arbiter.wipo/int/domains/ decisions (not protecting famous
name, citing drafting history of UDRP); Telestra, Case No. D2000-0003, para. 5.2
(finding that the passive holding of domain name satisfies "use" requirement);
Sporoptic Pouilloux S.A. v. Wilson, Case No. D2000-0265 (WIPO June 16, 2000)
(Introvigne, Panelist), at http://www.arbiter.wipo.int/domains.decisions (holding
that registration alone, without "use," does not violate UDRP); Fire-Trol Holdings,
L.L.C. v. Fire Foam Prods. Dev., Forum File No. NAF-FA93709 (NAF Mar. 20, 2000)
(Perluss, Arb.), at http://www.arbforum.com/domains/decisions (finding
famousness of mark relevant); Educ. Testing Serv. v. TOEFL, Case No. D2000-0044
(WIPO Mar. 16, 2000) (Abbott, Panelist), at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/
decisions (finding famousness irrelevant); Allocation Network GmbH v. Gregory,
Case No. D2000-0016 (WIPO Mar. 24, 2000) (Wefers Bettink, Panelist), at http://
arbiter.wipo.int/domains/ decisions (holding that marketing of generic domain
names is a legitimate use);J. Crew Int'l Inc. v. crew.com, Case No. D2000-0054 (WIPO
Apr. 20, 2000) (Page, Panelist), at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions
(holding that one who speculates in domain names has no legitimate interest in those
names); Adobe Sys. Inc. v. Domain OZ, Case No. D2000-0057 (WIPO Mar. 22, 2000)
(Abbott, Panelist), at http://arbiter.wipo.int/ domains/decisions (finding that
registration of four names constitutes a "pattern of conduct"); Kittinger Co. v.
Kittinger Collector, Case Nos. AF-0107a and AF-107b (eRes May 8, 2000) (Thompson,
Panelist), at http://www.eresolution.ca/services/dnd/decisions (finding that
registration of four names is not a "pattern of conduct"); EAuto, L.L.C. v. EAuto Parts,
Case No. D2000-0096 (WIPO Apr. 9, 2000) (Bernstein, Panelist), at http://
arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions (concluding that actual confusion is not required
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neither the Policy nor the Rules provide an internal appeal process, 80 no
mechanism exists for reconciling these inconsistent interpretations or
deciding which should be followed and which ignored. Combined, the
varying interpretations of the UDRP and the arbitrators' ability to incor-
porate unspecified legal principles undermine ICANN's goal of uniform-
ity. Decisions under the UDRP can be as inconsistent and unpredictable
as the decisions of various national courts. The privatization of disputes
has not managed to eliminate the uncertainty that concerns global
businesses.
Some of the inconsistent ICANN decisions reflect another character-
istic of the UDRP-the ability of a theoretically limited process to expand
beyond its intended limits. For example, in the process leading up to the
adoption of the UDRP, it was consciously and deliberately decided not to
include personal names or geographic terms, as international consensus
was lacking concerning the extent to which such "marks" should be pro-
tected.81 Nevertheless, the ICANN dispute resolution providers have
accepted cases based on personal names and city names, and their arbi-
trators have ruled in favor of the complainants. 8 2 ICANN panels have also
exceeded policy limits by narrowly defining legitimate use (as when the
panels find that noncompetitor sites that complain about the trademark
holder are not legitimate) and by expanding the definition of bad faith
(e.g., to include failure to respond to the complaint, or criticizing the
complainant) .83 After one panel has rendered an expansive decision, it
can spread to other cases as the "law" of ICANN develops. 84 Further, all
to show "likelihood of confusion"); CRS Tech. v. Condenet, Inc., File No.FA93547
(NAF Mar. 20, 2000) (Ayers, Arb.), at http://www.arbforum.com/domains/decisions
(holding that evidence of confusion is required).
80 While there is theoretically a de novo "appeal" to national court systems, such
an appeal is not of much practical use. See discussion infra note 137. In addition, those
de novo appeals would apply the law of some nation state rather than the UDRP and
ICANN Rules, and would be of little use in reconciling splits in interpretation of the
ICANN documents.
81 WIPO, MANAGEMENT OF INTERNET NAMES, supra note 35, paras. 165-68 (stating
that process was purposely limited to trademarks and service marks. "Thus,
registrations that violate trade names, geographical indications or personality rights
would not be considered to fall within the definition of abusive registration for the
purposes of the administrative procedure.").
82 See, e.g., Winterson, Case No. D2000-0235 (protecting "famous" name); Roberts
v. Boyd, Case No. D2000-210 (WIPO May 29, 2000) (Page, Panelist), at http://
arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions (citing Winterson and protecting famous name
"Julia Roberts"); Excelentisimo Ayuntamiento de Barcelona v. Barcelona.com, Case
No. D2000-0505 (WIPO Aug. 4, 2000) (Porzio, Panelist), at http://arbiter.wipo.int/
domains/decisions (transferring barcelona.corn from travel portal that had been
using the domain name to City of Barcelona).
83 Stewart, supra note 58, at 524-30.
84 For example, the Julia Roberts proceeding cited an earlier WIPO proceeding
that found protection of individual "famous" names involving British writer Jeanette
Winterson. See supra note 82. A later case involving Boston radio personality Nik
Carter cites both Winterson and Roberts. Carter v. Afternoon Fiasco, Case No. D2000-
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of this illicit expansion has been in one direction; it has favored trade-
mark owners over domain name holders.
It is not surprising that the ICANN process suffers from the flaws of
lack of legitimacy, uncontrolled choice of law decisions, inconsistent
interpretation, and unwarranted expansion. It is, in a sense, "out of con-
trol." The institution's birth was intended to give weight to the concerns
of intellectual property interests as Internet "stakeholders," and it did so.
Even the most carefully drafted policy, especially a policy that will be
applied to multinational actors and transactions, will have the potential to
expand into areas in which national laws and policies differ. Further,
because policies such as these are apt to be vague even (maybe especially)
about important issues, interpretation will be needed as the policy is
applied to various fact patterns. While some of these inequities could be
lessened by better balancing ICANN's power structure and by tweaking
the UDRP, they cannot be eliminated.
It is likely that the same kinds of problems will plague any ODR sys-
tem, especially one designed by unevenly matched parties. This is not a
problem unique to ICANN, but a problem inherent in attempts to priva-
tize and make uniform law that is public and varied. While the mecha-
nisms to check and confine privatized decisions could be stronger than
those in the UDRP, the processes involve too many legal systems, too
many conflicting policies, and too many people to be meaningfully con-
fined to legitimate "law" except in an extremely restricted, routine, and
harmonized area. Additionally, when the "legislative" choices are subject
to the control of powerful interested parties, and those parties see the
issues involved through the lens of their own concerns, the resulting sub-
stantive and procedural rules are apt to be slanted in their favor.
B. Lessons About Creating Procedures
ICANN sought two primary qualities in the UDRP: cheap and fast. It
is indeed cheap and fast, but at the cost of other process values. As Profes-
sor Dan Burk pointed out to the House Courts and Intellectual Property
Subcommittee, "While efficiency and speed are important aspects of a
dispute resolution process, fairness is also important."8 5 All parties can
benefit when a dispute is processed without undue delay. The prepara-
tion and presentation of an international dispute, however, can take time,
and there are limits to anyone's ability to accelerate a process without
sacrificing adequate notice, accuracy, and the ability of parties meaning-
fully to participate. 86 The UDRP's choices in the speed-fairness balance
are another reason for caution in choosing it as a model for ODR.
0658 (WIPO Oct. 17, 2000) (Partridge, Panelist), at http://arbiter.wipo.int/
domains/decisions.
85 McGuire, supra note 17; cf. FED. R. Crv. P. 1 (overriding goals of federal rules).
86 Michael E. Schneider & Christopher Kuner, Dispute Resolution in International
Electronic Commerce, J. IN'r'L ARB., Sept. 1997, at 5, 10-11.
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1. Forum Shopping
One flawed ICANN Rule applies at the outset of the UDRP proce-
dure: there are four approved dispute resolution providers, and the com-
plainant is absolutely allowed to choose any one as the forum. If the track
records of the entities were comparable, this might be a harmless error.
As time passes, however, it is becoming increasingly obvious that this pro-
cedure is allowing outcome-based forum shopping. From a statistical
standpoint, significant differences have emerged in the DRPs' tendency
to rule for complainants. For example, WIPO panels have ruled for the
complainant over 80% of the time, while eResolution and its arbitrators
have found for the complainant less than 60% of the time.87 This differ-
ence, coupled with the complainant's right to choose, has led to an
increasing tendency by complainants to choose WIPO. While WIPO
received 29% of the complaints filed in January 2000, when the record of
provider outcomes remained unpublished, by July 2000 it received 61%
of the complaints filed. 88 It has also been alleged that some DRPs subtly
advertise themselves as pro-complainant. 89 The privilege to forum-shop
has added to doubts about the legitimacy of the process. 90
2. Mandatory Participation
The ICANN procedure also violates the important principle of "lib-
erty": domain name holders have no choice but to participate, or suffer
the consequences, once the UDRP is invoked by the putative trademark
holder. While the result is not technically binding, there is no way for the
respondent to "opt out" of the process. Once the proceeding is filed, it
will proceed to a conclusion. If the complainant prevails, ICANN will
transfer or cancel the domain name unless the respondent assumes the
burden of filing a lawsuit. Perhaps if domain name holders also had to
consent to use of the private system after a dispute had arisen, the process
would prove itself less one-sided. As the European Commission com-
87 Geist, WIPO Wipes Out Rights, supra note 44; ETHAN KATSH & JANET RIFKIN,
ONLINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: RESOLVING CONFLICTS IN CYBERSPACE 111 (2001).
88 Geist, WIPO Wipes Out Rights, supra note 44; KATSH & RiFUN, supra note 87, at
111 (tracking filing rates through Jan. 2001); Milton Mueller, Rough Justice: An
Analysis of ICANN's Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy, at http://dcc.syr.edu/
roughjustice.htm (last visited Nov. 11, 2001) (finding forum shopping and bias in the
UDRP) (on file with the Journal of Small and Emerging Business Law).
89 King, supra note 74, at 500; Michael Geist, Fair.com?: An Examination of the
Allegations of Systemic Unfairness in the ICAAN UDRP, UDRPINFO.COM, Aug. 2001, at 4, at
http://aixl.uottawa.ca/-geist/geistudrp.pdf [hereinafter Geist, Fair.com?] (quoting
NAF press releases with a "distinctly pro-complainant tone"). Cf Trial Lawyers for
Public Justice, Comments to Fed. Trade Comm'n, Comments on Mandatory Binding Pre-
Dispute Arbitration in the United States Today, Mar. 22, 2000, at 8, http://ftc.gov/bcp/
altdisresolution/comments/landjr.pdf (commenting on advertising by dispute
resolution providers).
90 KATSH & RIFKIN, supra note 87, at 110-11.
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mented, "An effective, fair and rigorous ADR scheme . . .will be used
without the need for compulsion."9 1
It is technically true that the domain name holder has "consented"
to the UDRP in its "contract" with the registrar who assigned the domain
name, but this is a true contract of adhesion. 92 There is no way to acquire
a domain name ending in .com, .net, or .org without dealing with a regis-
trar accredited by ICANN, and the UDRP is a mandatory part of the deal.
The adhesive nature of the process would be equally objectionable if
imported into the business-to-consumer (B2C) context, or even business-
to-business (B2B) contracts involving significant power disparities,
although in those cases it may be the claimants rather than the respon-
dents who are the unwilling participants in the privatized process. A
mandatory process would be even more unacceptable in cases involving
no contractual consent whatsoever. The justification for an arbitral
model, which eliminates procedural and substantive rights that would
otherwise be present, is that the parties have consented to those reduced
rights. 93 No such consent is present in the UDRP.
3. Slanted Procedural Rules
The ICANN Rules, like most any system of procedural rules, also
demonstrate another procedural truth: procedures can have uneven
impacts, often predictably uneven impacts. A procedural system can be
structured in a way that gives one side significant advantages. In this case,
although most rules apply to both complainants and respondents, they
will sometimes disadvantage respondents alone in operation. For exam-
ple, the deadline to appeal an adverse panel decision is ten days for both
parties. While this sounds parallel, consider the different situations in
which the parties will find themselves. A losing complainant did not have
control over the domain name before the ICANN process, still lacks con-
trol over the domain name after the ICANN process, and can in fact file a
lawsuit at any time because the status quo has not changed. A losing
respondent, on the other hand, will go from controlling the domain
91 FED. TRADE COMM'N, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, COMMENTS BY THE EUROPEAN
COMMISSION ON ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION FOR CONSUMER TRANSACTIONS IN
THE BORDERLESS ONLINE MARKETPLACE (2000), at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/
altdisresolution/comments.
92 Cf Menkel-Meadow, supra note 15, at 52 ("[Tihe contractual basis of
arbitration is lost when consent is not real or where there are great power disparities
between the parties."); Richard E. Speidel, Contract Theory and Securities Arbitration:
Whither Consent, 62 BROOK L. REv. 1335, 1337 (1996) ("[T]he darker side [of
consent] involves the scope of freedom from contract which arises in the so-called
contract of 'adhesion.' How far may one party with superior bargaining power go to
require arbitration, define the terms of the contract to arbitrate and control the
procedures and processes of arbitration?").
93 Helfer & Dinwoodie, supra note 19, at 192.
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name to losing it unless a file-stamped copy is supplied to ICANN within
ten days from when ICANN learned of the panel's decision. 94
The supplemental rules of some DRPs also contain provisions that
can disadvantage respondents. For example, while a complainant can
choose the time to initiate the proceeding, waiting until it has compiled
all necessary documentation and artfully drafted its pleading, the respon-
dent has only twenty days from when the DRP sends the complaint to the
complainant in which to respond. Under the NAF Supplemental Rules,
the respondent may only request an extension of time if it confers with
the complainant and files a request in writing along with a $100 request
fee, all within the original twenty day deadline. 9 5 Thus, respondents,
unlike complainants, must pay for the extra time required to prepare
their only meaningful submission to the decisionmaker.9 6
4. No Mechanism for Information Sharing
The UDRP is also a flawed model for cases in which one party needs
information from the other. In conventional litigation, discovery exists as
a tool to provide all parties with access to relevant information. Once the
parties are aware of that information, they can present a fuller account to
the trier of fact. This, in turn, leads to more fair and accurate trial out-
comes. 9 7 Discovery is particularly necessary because, at the outset of many
disputes, one party may have the bulk of relevant information while the
other party lacks such information. 98 When a private dispute resolution
system limits discovery, it limits a device that otherwise serves to equalize
the parties' relative positions. "To the extent that the private system's
inquiry is less thorough, the private system permits the underlying power
of the stronger party to persist undeflected." 99 Even systems without a
"discovery" process have alternate mechanisms to compel the revelation
of information, and international arbitration can force the parties to pro-
duce relevant documents or face adverse inferences. The UDRP lacks
94 A. MICHAEL FROOMKIN, COMMENTS ON ICANN UNIFORM DISPUTE POLICY
(1999), at http://www.law.miami.edu/-amf/icann-udp.htm.
15 NAT'L ARBITRATION FORUM, supra note 28, § 6.
" Until October 15, 2001, NAF also had a supplemental rule regarding replies
that could be used to respondent's disadvantage. Both parties were allowed to file a
request for permission to file a reply containing new matter (and pay $250 just to file
the request), and both replies were given the same deadline (five days from when the
response was due or submitted, whichever is earlier). If the complainant submits this
supplemental filing on the last possible day, respondent had no opportunity to
respond to the new allegations or documents. Under the revised rule, however,
parties have an additional five days to respond to their opponents' replies. Id. § 7.
17 See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947) (discussing value and purpose of
discovery).
98 Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Sanctifying Secrecy: The Mythology of the Corporate
Attorney-Client Privilege, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 157, 203 (1993).
99 Bryant G. Garth, Privatization and the New Market for Disputes: A Framework for
Analysis and a Preliminary Assessment, in 12 STUDIES IN LAW, POLITICS, AND SOCIETY 367,
382 (Susan S. Sibley & Austin Sarat eds., 1992).
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even this. Nor has it been interpreted as a summary judgment-like pro-
ceeding in which the complainant loses in the event of any factual
dispute.
Arbitrators, under the ICANN dispute resolution system, base their
decisions on a complaint from the trademark owner and, in the absence
of default, a response from the domain name registrant. Each side is only
able to submit information and attach documents to which it already has
access. Although theoretically the arbitrator can request further state-
ments or documents, the arbitrator can only request documents that she
knows about. Such action seems highly unlikely when the decision must
be rendered in fourteen days. Consequently, the process leaves the com-
plainant with no method of learning more about the respondent's intent
or use of the domain name. It leaves the respondent with no method of
learning more about the trademark owner's right to the mark. This lack
of discovery or other disclosure device might be relatively insignificant in
the clear cases of cybersquatting for which the UDRP was designed. It is
more problematic in genuinely contested cases and cases in which the
complainant is relying on a common law right rather than a registered
trademark. It would also be cause for concern if the UDRP process were
adopted for consumer disputes, defamation cases, fraud cases, antitrust
cases, invasion of privacy cases, personal injury cases, or the like. Cer-
tainly, adding procedures requiring more information sharing to the pro-
cess will add costs in terms of time and money, but it will also add to the
overall fairness of an ODR process.10 0
5. Lack of Meaningful Hearings
The UDRP also uses a "hearing" process that is a poor model for any
dispute that involves contested facts, especially contested facts not
embodied in pre-existing documents. The ICANN arbitrator reads the
parties' pleadings and attached documents and makes a decision. The
pleadings are not even made under oath, but rather under an assertion of
good faith similar to a federal court Rule 11 assertion.10 1 The Policy does
not provide any penalty for making false statements in the complaint or
response. 10 2
Similarly, there is no adequate system to allow the fact finder to con-
sider the kinds of information needed to resolve disputed facts. Under
the ICANN dispute resolution procedure, any kind of hearing would be
highly unusual. The Rules virtually prohibit even video conferences, tele-
100 Cf TimothyJ. Heinsz, The Revised Uniform Arbitration Act: Modernizing Revising
and Clarifying Arbitration Law, 2001 J. Disp. RESOL. 1, 46-50 (2001) (discussing the
need to balance the policies favoring prehearing discovery and avoidance of expense
and delay).
101 FED. R. Crv. P. 11.
102 ICANN Rules, supra note 16, §§ 3(b)(xiv) and 5(b)(viii). One filing a
complaint in bad faith could be branded as a reverse domain name hijacker, but the
only penalty is the bad publicity for being so categorized.
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phone conferences, and web conferences. 10 3 Instead of hearing wit-
nesses, the arbitrator makes her decision based on written submissions
and accompanying documents. This is fast, but not helpful. Even WIPO
has conceded that the process could be inadequate for more fact-inten-
sive domain name disputes. 104 The procedure would prove completely
inadequate should the arbitrator need to decide whether a product was
defective, a statement libelous, or a market monopolized if an ICANN-
like procedure were used to resolve other types of Internet disputes. Also,
when disputes involve decisions about the amount of damages, not the
case in the ICANN process, 10 5 an additional layer of factual disputes may
require resolution.
Any dispute resolution system that applies law to fact, including a
system that is operated online, needs to find ways to deal fairly with fac-
tual disputes. For example, credibility issues may be difficult to resolve
without demeanor evidence or cross-examination, and some disputes may
require the arbitrator to examine tangible evidence. 106 "[T]hought needs
to be given to the means through which the average [claimant] may sub-
mit evidence to the mechanism (certainly not ruling out ordinary mail)
and how a mechanism may obtain credible testimony from witnesses
(including how and when electronic 'witnesses' may be questioned)." 107
Even in the limited context of domain name disputes, arbitrators
have noted the impact of the UDRP when credibility issues are involved.
Responding to a complainant's request to cross-examine respondent's
evidence in order to establish bad faith, the panel responded that a mat-
ter requiring this kind of credibility check would be better resolved in "a
forum, like a United States court, that permits for a more probing, sear-
ing search for the truth. This proceeding is not conducive to such credi-
bility determinations given the lack of discovery and, in the normal
course, the lack of live testimony."10 8 The limitations on the presentation
103 Id. §13.
104 WIPO, THE RECOGNITION OF RIGHTS, supra note 27, 1 318(iii).
105 UDRP, supra note 16, § 4(i) (only award will be cancellation or transfer of the
domain name).
106 COUNCIL OF BETTER BUSINESS BUREAUS, supra note 47, at 14, http://
www.bbbonline.org/about/press/whitepaper.doc. See also Kornfeld, supra note 58, at
1 ("[The UDRP's] truncated nature may not be suitable for relatively complex cases
involving a variety of claims and factual assertions .... [T]he process includes no
testimony, cross-examination, briefing, or argument ..... The UDRP has no
mechanism for evidentiary review; therefore facts, such as trademark rights, may be
merely alleged.").
107 COUNCIL OF BETTER BUSINESS BUREAUS, supra note 47, at 14, http://
www.bbbonline.org/about/press/whitepaper.doc.
108 Document Tech. v. Int'l Elec. Communications, Case No. D2000-0270 (WIPO
June 2, 2000) (Bernstein, Panelist), at http://arbiter.wipo.int/ domains/decisions
(also refusing to consider complainant's supplemental filing). In that situation, the
panel correctly ruled that the complainant had not met its burden of proof. The
complainant remains free to file an action under the ACPA in federal court, once
again attempting to acquire the domain name. However, the same problem could
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of evidence make it inadequate even for the cases into which the UDRP
has evolved10 9 and certainly for most types of internet disputes.
6. Unimaginative Use of Technology and ADR Methods
The UDRP also makes very unimaginative use of existing technology.
Even today, distant parties need not be confined to asynchronous written
communication. Video conferencing, or the exchange of video files,
would be a way to supply the fact finder with oral and nonverbal informa-
tion missing from a purely written communication. Depending on the
needs of the process, video technologies could be used synchronously or
asynchronously. While it could not completely replace in person, face-to-
face encounters, it could provide an improvement over a single exchange
of email.1 10 If written cross-examination would suffice, web-based com-
munication methods such as chat rooms or instant messaging would offer
real-time options.
The UDRP also ignores many existing ADR methodologies. If ODR
were to be applied in other areas, looking only to stripped-down arbitra-
tion neglects numerous richer options. For example, mediators are
actively involved in developing the standards and skills needed to adapt
to the online environment, and a mediated resolution could, in some
situations, provide a more satisfying solution to all parties.11 1 Other tech-
niques, such as early neutral evaluation or mediated settlement confer-
ences, may also be useful in the online setting.
7. Decisionmaker Bias
Whatever method of resolving disputes is chosen, the ICANN process
also demonstrates the bias that can creep into the arbitral process. Proce-
dural fairness requires that the decisionmaker be neutral. 1 2 Among
other things, this requires that the tribunal not have a personal interest in
arise in cases in which respondents challenge the credibility of complainant's
assertions. If arbitrators nevertheless take the assertions on face value and find that
complainants have met their burden of proof, the respondent will have been harmed
through deprivation of an important process right; it will have lost the domain name
through the UDRP without the opportunity to test the credibility of complainant's
assertions.
109 If ICANN adopted and enforced a rule that any material factual dispute
required a ruling for respondent, thereby forcing disputed cases out of the UDRP and
into the courts, the lack of a meaningful hearing would be less of a problem in the
domain name context.
"l0 Frank A. Cona, Focus on Cyberlaw: Application of Online Systems in Alternative
Dispute Resolution, 45 Burr. L. REv. 972, 992 (1997); but see Joel B. Eisen, Are We Ready
for Mediation in Cyberspace, 1998 B.Y.U. L. REv. 1305, 1335-40 (1998) (pointing out
that use of technology can be a barrier to those who cannot afford it).
"l See COLIN RuLE, NEW MEDIATOR CAPABILITIES IN ONLINE DisPuTE RESOLUTION,
at http://www.mediate.com/articles/rule.cfm (last visited Nov. 11, 2001) (on file with
the Journal of Small and Emerging Business Law); see generally KATSH & RJFKN, supra
note 87.
112 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271 (1970).
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the outcome.' 1 3 It also requires that the decisionmaker be unbiased.
Sometimes bias is direct: the arbitrator has, for example, a prior relation-
ship with one of the parties or a financial stake in the dispute. 114 This
kind of bias is often prohibited by the tribunal's rules. Other times bias is
indirect, growing out of "such subtle heuristics as cultural and profes-
sional biases." 11 5 A system in which one of the parties chooses the arbitra-
tion provider may involve a subtle kind of direct bias. Responsible
providers of arbitral services probably have codes of ethics requiring arbi-
trators to disclose any direct conflicts of interest such as prior representa-
tion of a party, a financial stake in the outcome, or family relationship to
a party. In the UDRP setting, however, this kind of direct bias arises from
the volume of business that a repeat player can bestow.1 16 "[I] n this era of
entrepreneurial ADR, the arbitrator often does have a subtle but substan-
tial economic interest in the outcome of the case in that his or her ability
to get future cases depends, at least in part, on party satisfaction." 1 7 In
the ICANN context, it is the trademark holders who are capable of bring-
ing numerous cases to the arbitrator. 1 18 As long as the DRPs are "depen-
dent on getting their fees from Complainants, and thus have an interest
in keeping Complainants happy, we are in danger of having a biased
system."119
"I Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927) (finding due process violation when
judge compensated from proceeds of fines).
114 Reuben, supra note 55, at 1058.
115 Id.
116 Garth, supra note 99, at 382 ("If decision makers depend on a certain
clientele for their business, and that clientele has a particular perspective or long-
standing practice, we should not be surprised if that perspective or practice is not
challenged."). For a helpful general discussion of the relationship between repeat
player status and arbitral bias, see generally Lisa B. Bingham, On Repeat Players, Adhesive
Contracts, and the Use of Statistics in Judicial Review of Employment Arbitration Awards, 29
McGEORGE L. REv. 223 (1998); Lisa B. Bingham, Employment Arbitration: The Repeat
Player Effect, 1 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'YJ. 189 (1997); Alan Scott Rau, Integrity in Pivate
Judging, 38 S. TEX. L. REv. 485 (1999).
117 Reuben, supra note 55, at 1063.
118 See A. MICHArL FROOMKIN, COMMENTS ON WIPO DNS RFC3, at http://
wipo2.wipo.int/process2/rfc/rfc3/comments/docs/wipo2.html ("Since
complainants choose the arbitral body, the current system creates a financial
incentive for arbitral bodies to compete to be 'complainant friendly'.") (on file with
the Journal of Small and Emerging Business Law); Helfer & Dinwoodie, supra note
19, at 211 (discussing incentives to be perceived as pro-complainant). In arbitration
generally, Trial Lawyers for Public Justice, for example, alleges that the National
Arbitration Forum markets its arbitration services as providing a defense for financial
services companies against lawsuits from their consumers, and that MCI has a very
close financial relationship with its mandatory arbitration service provider. Trial
Lawyers for Public Justice, supra note 89, at 8-9, http://ftc.gov/bcp/
altdisresolution/comments/landjr.pdt.
119 King, supra note 74, at 501. In some cases, the portion of the filing fee that
goes to the provider rather than the arbitrator is a significant one. Compare CPR
INSTITUTE FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION, supra note 28, para. 13 (single panelist, 1-2
domain names, $1000 to Panelist and $1000 to CPR) with ERESOLUTION, supra note 30
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Indirect bias is harder to pin down. Arbitrators, unlike conventional
judges, are often valued for their substantive expertise in the subject area.
Expertise is considered to be a positive factor, but it comes with a flip
side: with expertise can come bias. For example, 89% of the arbitrators in
the securities industry have been shown to be white males with an average
age of sixty, many of whom spent their professional careers in the broker-
age industry. 120 It would not be surprising if former brokers were more
likely to sympathize with the broker's side of the dispute. In health care
arbitration, it would not be surprising if doctor-arbitrators were more
likely to sympathize with the doctor's side of the dispute.1 21
Is indirect bias a problem in the implementation of the UDRP? It
seems likely. Information about the identity and backgrounds of the arbi-
trators participating in the ICANN cases is available online. 122 Reading
the biographical sketches, it appears that most of the UDRP arbitrators
are practicing intellectual property attorneys. As Professors Helfer and
Dinwoodie note:
It is at least an open question whether decisionmakers from the
private sector can sufficiently distance themselves from the milieu
in which they practice to self-limit their own powers and develop
balanced norms for the trademark-domain name interface. This is
particularly true if panelists are permitted to trade on their UDRP
expertise by representing trademark owners in future domain
name disputes. 123
Nothing in the rules bars a person from representing parties in some
UDRP proceedings and serving as panelists in others. This is therefore an
institution in which a person can serve as both judge and advocate. For
example, in the ICANN proceeding concerning the domain name
"bancochile.com," the Chilean bank was represented by Marino Porzio,
who is best known for his decision as the UDRP arbitrator who awarded
the domain name "barcelona.com" to the municipal government of Bar-
celona, Spain, taking it away from the operator of a Web portal for the
(single panelist, 1-2 domain names, $1000 to panelist and $250 to eRes). Statistics
about forum shopping by complainants substantiate these concerns. See supra text
accompanying notes 87-90.
120 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION: How
REGISTERED REPRESENTATIVES FARE IN DISCRIMINATION DISPUTES 2 (1994).
121 For an argument that such bias is a price worth paying to get expertise, see
Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration and Unconscionability After Doctor's Associates, Inc. v.
Casarotto, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1001, 1021-22 (1996).
122 Information about approved panelists is located on each DRP's website. See
CPR Specialized Panels, at http://www.cpradr.org/speclpan- domainname.htm (last
visited Nov. 8, 2001); eRESOLUTION, at http://www.eresolution.ca/services/dnd/
arbitrators.htm (last updated Oct. 24, 2001); National Arbitration Forum, at http://
www.arbforum.com/ about/arbitrators.asp (last visited Feb. 7, 2002); WIPO Domain
Name Panelists, at http://www.arbiter.wipo.int/domains/panel/panelists.html (last
modified Nov. 8, 2001).
123 Hefer & Dinwoodie, supra note 19, at 212.
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city. 124 Despite the absence of conscious animus, it is likely that arbitra-
tors bring to the UDRP process their pre-existing attitudes toward the
manipulable policy.' 25 The perspective through which the decision
maker views a case can affect both the results in individual cases and the
long-term interpretation and application of the UDRP.
Given these inevitable biases, the ICANN Policy fails in another
important way. Each DRP lists a number of approved arbitrators, but
there is no information about how particular individuals are assigned to
particular cases, particularly those involving only one arbitrator.12 6 In
those cases, the parties have no input into the assignment of the arbitra-
tor. Except in cases of the most obvious and improper kind of bias, it is
unlikely a party could successfully challenge a panelist. Each DRP has its
own procedural rules regarding challenges. 27 The grounds upon which
a challenge can be brought also vary. For example, NAF sets forth specific
grounds for disqualification.1 28 None would preclude an arbitrator with
known attitudes about the meaning of controversial UDRP provisions
from deciding a case. Nor is there a system for allowing parties, after a
proceeding is over, to register complaints about a particular
decisionmaker.129
Professor Geist has recently completed a study of the assignment of
arbitrators to cases by the various DRPs in the first 3,000 ICANN deci-
sions. This study reached a troubling conclusion: the identity of the arbi-
trators is the most important factor in determining case outcomes, and
"case allocation appears to be heavily biased toward ensuring that a
majority of cases are steered toward complainant-friendly panelists.' 30
Nor does it seem that arbitrator allocation is random. Some arbitrators
124 See Banco de Chile v. Bord, Case No. D2001-0695 (WIPO Aug. 14, 2001)
(Limbury, Panelist), at www.arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions.
125 Cf Ellen E. Deason, Court-Appointed Expert Witnesses: Scientific Positivism Meets
Bias and Deference, 77 OR. L. REv. 59, 98-100 (1998); Bernard L. Diamond, The Fallacy
of the Impartial Expert, 3 ARCHvE ClM. PSYCHoDYNAmics 221 (1959) (both contending
that expertise is not neutral).
126 It is even more important that arbitrators whose decisions are virtually
unreviewable be unbiased than that judges be so. This is particularly true when the
arbitration is in effect a process "devised by insiders to be imposed on outsiders."
Katherine Van Wetzel Stone, Rustic Justice: Community and Coercion under the Federal
Arbitration Act, 77 N.C. L. REv. 931, 1017 (1999).
127 For example, although WIPO has no specific rule, it notes that it does its own
check as to "whether there are any facts or circumstances, past or present, or that
could arise in the foreseeable future, that might call into question that person's
independence in the eyes of one or both of the parties." WIPO SUPPLEMENTAL RuLEs,
§ 8 Annex C. NAF allows five days from appointment to challenge an arbitrator.
NAT'L ARBrrRATION FORUM, supra note 28, § 10(d).
128 NAT'L ARBITRATION FORUM, supra note 28, § 10(b) (listing personal bias
concerning a party, prior representation of a party, direct financial interest, and
relationship within the third degree to a party or attorney).
129 Kornfeld, supra note 58, at 9.
IM Geist, Fair.com, supra note 89, at 8.
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on the approved list are never chosen.1 3 ' Others serve frequently. For
example, despite a roster of 131 panelists, 53% of all single arbitrator
cases at the National Arbitration Forum (512 of 966 cases) were decided
by only 6 people, and complainants won 94% of those cases. 13 2 There
may be innocent explanations for this pattern. But, as noted above, DRPs
do have significant financial incentives to develop a reputation of being
complainant-friendly so long as complainants alone choose where to file
their cases.
Only in three-member panels do the parties have any control over
assignment of arbitrators. In these situations, each party chooses one arbi-
trator, providing a better chance that at least one member of the panel
will share that party's approach to the law. They also have the advantage
of requiring discussion and consultation among the arbitrators, which
should lead to a more thorough consideration of the issues raised by the
case. 1 33 In international commercial arbitration, use of a three-member
panel is the accepted norm, and often a default rule if the parties fail to
specify a different selection method.13 4 In UDRP cases involving three-
member panels, complainants win about 60% of the time, as opposed to
single-arbitrator cases, in which they win about 83% of the time. 135
Excluding default cases, complainants win in three-member-panel cases
only 45% of the time.1 36 These statistical disparities, along with accepted
international practice, indicate that an ODR system that operates on an
arbitration-like model and strives for fairness should adopt three-member
panels, with party input into the choice of panelists. While this would
increase costs, and might add to the time required for deliberation, the
improvement in accuracy of individual cases and legitimacy of the process
would offset the disadvantages.
131 For example, two arbitrators, both of whom are probably considered more
friendly to respondents, have participated in three-member panels (chosen by
respondents) but have never been chosen to be the single arbitrator, despite allegedly
random assignments in 1,629 WIPO single-panel cases. Yet 104 arbitrators were
selected 5 or more times by WIPO to decide single panel cases. Id. at 26.
132 Id. at 8. While the existence of default cases explains some of this result, it
does not explain all. None of the other DRPs have similar statistics. For example, the
6 busiest panelists at WIPO decided 17.2% of the cases and the 6 busiest panelists at
eResolution decided 17.3% of the cases. Id. at 25.
133 Helfer & Dinwoodie, supra note 19, at 194.
134 Id., citing Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, U.N. Commission
on International Trade Law, 18th Sess., Art. 11(3), U.N. Doc. A/40/17, Annex 1
(1985), reprinted in 1985 U.N. Comm'n on Int'l Trade L. Y.B. 16, U.N. Sales No.
E.87.V.4, available at http://www.uncitral.org/en-index.htm.
135 Geist, Fair.com, supra note 89, at 8. One might conclude from this data that
respondents are the ones who usually opt for the three-member panel. Surprisingly, it
is often the complainant who chooses the three-member option; they are responsible
for about 62% of those panels. Professor Geist suggests that complainants are aware
of the possibility of "inconsistent and poorly reasoned decisions" from a single
arbitrator and choose more panelists to decrease the possibility of a wrong decision.
Id. at 21.
136 Id. at 20.
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It is not likely that the arbitrators with pro-complainant records are
purposely slanting their decisions toward trademark holders. Rather, they
come to the process with certain attitudes toward trademarks and their
role in the domain name system, and these attitudes predispose them to
want to protect the plum of exclusive domain name rights for those
whom they see as the most worthy owners. This is human and under-
standable, but it is unacceptable in a dispute resolution system that pur-
ports to be unbiased and fair.
8. No Review Mechanism
UDRP arbitrators have rendered decisions that are inconsistent in
their interpretation of the substantive requirements and in their imple-
mentation of the procedural rules. Because the process contains no inter-
nal appeal process, there is no way to challenge any of these decisions,
either to correct the result in an individual case or to reconcile splits in
what is becoming the "law" of ICANN. 13 7 There is no way to correct arbi-
trators who are creating bad "law" or those who believe that trademark
holders should have broader rights than those included in the UDRP as
written.' 3 8 "The result is rule by individual arbitrator rather than rule by a
'uniform' dispute resolution policy."139 In ICANN's case, we are able to
document these inconsistencies because UDRP decisions are available.
Any ODR system looking to ICANN for lessons should heed the problem
of decisionmaker discrepancies and consider a method for monitoring
decisions and a realistic system of appeal.
V. UNEQUAL POWER AND THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENTS
Examining the UDRP from a distance also yields some more general
lessons about the problems of creating privatized processes and the role
that governments should play in their design and implementation. Any
137 Although theoretically a party disappointed with the result of the UDRP
process can file a lawsuit to try to change the result, it is not an appeal but a de novo
process. It is also likely to be characterized by the problems of cost and delay that the
UDRP was adopted to prevent. There have been more than three thousand ICANN
proceedings disposed of by decision, and only about twenty five lawsuits filed to
challenge the result. While this could reflect total happiness with the process, it seems
more likely that it is at least in part due to the unrealistically short deadline and the
probable expense of the process. An internal appeal, particularly one in which the
appellate panel was as balanced as possible, could add less cost for both parties and
provide a more meaningful check on erroneous decisions. See also supra text
accompanying note 94 for a discussion of the problems created by the short appeal
deadline. See generally Heifer & Dinwoodie, supra note 19, 225-30 (listing reasons that
appeal to national courts is an inadequate check on UDRP decisions).
138 NeilJ. Cohen, Forum: ICANN at the Crossroads, 1 INTERNET L. & Bus. 583, 584
(2000). See also Kornfeld, supra note 58 (noting that some arbitrators were less than
enthusiastic about free speech, gave generic names more protection than would U.S.
trademark law, and failed to recognize bulk registration as a legitimate business).
139 Cohen, supra note 138, at 584.
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system that aspires to be fair must keep in mind the comparative power of
the participants, and must include a way to monitor and enforce at least
minimum standards.
Some Internet theory harkens back to the Net's early days as a rela-
tively homogeneous band of fellow scientists and computer geeks. It
posits that the rules of the Internet should be established through self-
regulation that arises through the practices of the Internet community.
140
With the addition of major commercial activity, the ideological hostility
to government intervention shared by early Internet enthusiasts has now
been bolstered by the free market vision of the commercial users. This
law created by contract is alleged to be both more efficient and more fair
than whatever a traditional government might require.
1 41
The ICANN experience, as well as the contracts of adhesion begin-
ning to be used in e-commerce transactions, causes the concept of the
Internet as a "community" of users regulating only themselves to collapse
when commercial interests are at stake. As Professor Lemley notes:
"[N]orms often operate among peers. If the society is divided into differ-
ent groups-say, one group that always sells and another group that
always buys-their desires and expectations from interaction may be so
different that informal agreement is unlikely.1 4 2 In analyzing the priva-
140 David R. Johnson, Industry & Government Have Swapped Traditional Roles of
Advocacy and Oversight in Shaping Internet Policy, LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 12, 1998, at 28;
David G. Post & David R. Johnson, Chaos Prevailing on Every Continent: Towards a New
Theory of Decentralized Decision-Making in Complex Systems, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 1055,
1086-88 (1998). Such theorists often refer to desirable Net ordering as "bottom-up,"
a term coined by Freidrich Hayek and referring to "the laissez-faire network of
promises among individuals, the growing-up of customary norms" (good) as opposed
to "top-down" law laid down by the state (bad). See Margaret Jane Radin & R. Polk
Wagner, The Myth of Private Ordering: Rediscovering Legal Realism in Cyberspace, 73 CHI.-
KENT L. REv. 1295, 1297 (1998).
141 David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders-The Rise of Law in Cyberspace,
48 STAN. L. REv. 1367 (1996) (arguing that the architecture of cyberspace precludes
notice of governing law that is crucial to law's legitimacy, and "spillover" effects lead
to application of the law of a nation with no right to govern a particular transaction).
See also Neil Weinstock Netanel, Cyberspace Self-Governance: A Skeptical View from Liberal
Democratic Theory, 88 CAL. L. REv. 395, 401 (2000) (noting that for supporters of
cyberspace self-government,
cyberspace is partly a model and partly a metaphor for a fundamental
restructuring of our political institutions. Cyberians view cyberspace as a realm in
which 'bottom-up private ordering' can and, indeed, should supplant rule by the
distant, sluggish, and unresponsive bureaucratic state. By its very architecture and
global reach, they contend, cyberspace will ultimately elude the strictures of state-
created law, challenging the efficacy and theoretical underpinnings of the
territorial sovereign state.)
142 Mark A. Lemley, The Law and Economics of Internet Norms, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REv.
1257, 1273 (1998). See alsoJulie E. Cohen, Copyright and the Jurisprudence of Self-Help, 13
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1089, 1123 (1998) (Applied to the consumer mass market, "the
notion that commercial law should be premised on market norms is deeply
problematic.... Norms presuppose communities, and.., the community that drives
the evolution of mass-market norms is the community of providers.")
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tized processes, we should abandon the fiction that these systems evolve
naturally from the shared values of equally influential parties. 14 3
Depending on the context, it is likely that the interests of small and
emerging businesses are aligned with consumers on these issues. When
dealing with larger, more powerful businesses (such as when serving as a
supplier or franchisee), small businesses may find themselves on the
receiving end of a contract of adhesion. They may also find themselves
unprotected by traditional consumer law.14 4 Notice, for example, that
when the American Arbitration Association proudly announced the adop-
tion of B2B dispute-resolution guidelines, they did so with the backing of
Microsoft, AT&T, and FedEx Corp. 14 5 These guidelines stress speed and
cost savings and promise only ambiguous platitudes:
We believe that all businesses are entitled to a fundamentally fair
dispute management process that includes access to neutral dis-
pute resolution providers.... We encourage the use of a variety of
cost-effective methods to resolve disputes at the earliest possible
stage.... We support the use of appropriate technology to aid the
swift and economical management of disputes. 146
Is a party entitled to a lawyer, to discovery, to a live hearing, to cross-
examine witnesses, to a written decision, to appeal the decision, to choose
litigation instead? Must it pay exorbitant filing fees? Can it be forced to
give up its right to a jury trial before a dispute has even arisen? None of
these issues are addressed.
Further, in the absence of some kind of reliable certification pro-
gram for B2C disputes, customers may choose to buy from large real-
world businesses rather than an intriguing small but unknown company,
especially one located in another country. In a world free of standards or
accountability for ADR programs, a consumer may easily choose the large
company with a local "real world" store rather than risk a dispute with a
small and distant Internet merchant. This diminishes the choices of con-
sumers and diminishes the Internet's democratizing ability to let smaller
sellers reach a larger market.
143 See Edward Brunet, Toward Changing Models of Securities Arbitration, 62 BROOK.
L. REv. 1459, 1475-76 (1996).
144 Small businesses are also likely to be disadvantaged in the ICANN process
itself. For example, a small enterprise may have difficulty meeting the twenty-day
response deadline, may not be able to afford a lawyer to represent it in the UDRP
proceeding, and also may not be able to afford an expensive lawsuit to challenge an
adverse UDRP decision.
145 Craig Stedman, Arbitration Group Proposes B2B Dispute-Resolution Guidelines,
COMPUTERWORLD, Jan. 4, 2001, at http://www.computerworld .com/storyba/
0,4125,NAV47_ST055850,00.html (on file with The Journal of Small and Emerging
Business Law).
146 AM. ARBITRATION ASS'N, ECOMMERCE DisPuTE MANAGEMENT PROTOCOL:
PRINCIPLES FOR MANAGING BUSINEss-To-BusINEss RELATIONSHIPS, http:// www.adr.org/
index2.1.jsp?JSPssid=10838 (last visited Mar. 17, 2002).
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These power disparities also illustrate that even technologically
accessible processes may not function equitably unless the system pro-
vides some kind of representative for the weaker party. Many respondents
may have defaulted because they are unable to cope with drafting a legal-
istic answer, complete with supporting documents, on twenty-days'
notice. They may not be able to decipher the shifting burdens of proof
regarding legitimate interests and bad faith registration and use. 14 7 In
this case and others, the ODR provider or other group should supply the
one-shot player with some assistance. This could take the form of a law-
yer, an ombudsperson, a user group, or a facilitator, so long as the assis-
tant is competent and has not been co-opted by the more powerful
party.1 48 The change to the online environment does not eliminate the
need for advice about legal and procedural rights1 4 9 or the need for help
in fully presenting a party's factual position. If disputants have the right
to request particular arbitrators or mediators, an ombudsperson could
knowledgeably advise them. The need to use sophisticated ODR technol-
ogy may in fact create an additional need for help, if only to assist a party
with the computer equipment or skills needed to participate. In a mul-
tinational setting, a representative may also be needed to help deal with
the problems in communication generated by language and cultural
gaps.1 50 In short, an ombudsperson has the potential to become a kind of
repeat player in the particular dispute resolution process and thereby
help make the process operate more evenhandedly.
People drafting rules and standards should also be honest about the
decisions they are making about risk. Often you can shift risk, but you
cannot eliminate it. The desire for the privatized processes arises largely
out of the uncertainty created by differing national laws. The solutions do
not negate the risk-they shift it. In the case of the UDRP as it is being
interpreted, it shifts risk from trademark holder to domain name holder,
including those small businesses trying to establish an identity on the
147 Respondents are less likely than complainants to be assisted by lawyers even
when they do respond. Webster, supra note 17, at 227.
'1 See Ethan Katsh, The Online Ombuds Office: Adapting Dispute Resolution to
Cyberspace, at http://www.mediate.com/articles/katsh/cfm (last visited Nov. 12, 2001)
(explaining role of ombudsperson generally and online) (on file with The Journal of
Small and Emerging Business Law); Schneider & Kuner, supra note 86, at 26, 32-33
(suggesting collective action through user groups or a facilitator to handle disputes).
149 Yes, I know, theoretically ADR isn't about rights but about interests. But a
party cannot evaluate her options, including whether to assert possible rights, without
knowing what relief the conventional legal system might or might not provide. And,
ICANN's version of ADR is still an adversarial process that is theoretically applying
legal rules.
'50 Nora Femenia, ODR and the Global Management of Customers' Complaints: How
Can ODR Techniques Be Responsive to Different Social and Cultural Environments? (Dec. 12,
2000), at http://www.mediate.com/ articles/femenia.cfm (paper originally presented
at the Joint Conference of the OECD, HCOPIL, and ICC at the Hague).
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Internet. 1 5 1 In the e-commerce context, arbitration clauses can shift too
much risk from the merchant to the consumer. In doing so, they shift risk
to the party whose understanding of the transaction is already crippled by
market failure. 152 This is not only unfair, but also counterproductive. A
dispute resolution system that shifts risk can decrease the incentive that a
resourceful party might have to find better ways to decrease that risk. For
example, sophisticated search engines can significantly decrease a busi-
ness's need to have a particular domain name in order for Internet users
to locate its particular web site; given sufficient incentive, the technology
to search for particular companies will be devised. If sellers wanted poten-
tial customers to be able to compare customer service/dispute resolution
systems, they would advertise them, and shopping "bots" would be cre-
ated that could search for warranty and ADR terms as well as for price
and physical features. If knowledge of the law is the problem, some enter-
prising multinational accounting firm would create (and sell access to) a
database with relevant information. If being subjected to the courts and
laws of too many countries is unacceptable, technologies that allow an
Internet actor to target or de-target particular areas will be perfected as a
way to decrease the risk. 15 3 These developments may happen in any case,
as arbitration systems shift risk imperfectly, but they might happen faster
if greater incentive remains on the party with the resources and the
expertise to find a better solution.
Government still needs to play a role in the world of otherwise pri-
vate dispute resolution. First, national or international bodies should set
minimum standards for ADR due process. 154 These dispute resolution
systems are performing public functions, and asking public courts to
151 Mueller, supra note 88, at 25 ("Start-ups need to be able to establish a
presence and an identity. It is wrong to make challenges to domain name
registrations too easy, and it is unwise to tilt dispute resolution criteria too far toward
protection of existing trademarks.")
152 John Rothchild, Protecting the Digital Consumer: The Limits of Cyberspace
Utopianism, 74 IND. L.J. 893, 943 (1999); Gibbons, supra note 15, at 793; Brunet, supra
note 143, at 1464.
153 This last technology is already emerging, although the main impetus seems to
come from those entities wishing to engage in regulatory arbitrage (conducting a
business - such as online gambling - that would be illegal in certain states or
countries) or to do targeted advertising (finding customers most likely to purchase
the seller's goods). See generally Matt Richtel, High Stakes in the Race to Invent a Better-
Blocker, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2001, http://www.nytimes.com/2001/06/28/
technology/28GAMB.html; Stefanie Olsen, Yahoo Ads Close in on Visitors' Locale,
CNETNEWs.COM, June 27, 2001, at http://news.cnet.com/news/0-1005-200-
6397360.html (reporting that Yahoo signed a deal to send consumers specific online
ads based on where they live or work) (on file with the Journal of Small and Emerging
Business Law); Michael Geist, E-borders Loom, for Better or Worse, GLOBE & MAIL, June
28, 2001, at http://news.globetechnology.com/servlet/ GAMAArticleHTML.
154 It may be that international consensus on ODR due process would be as
elusive as international consensus on substantive law. For a discussion of the issue by
the Australian government, see CONSUMER AFFAIRS DIVISION, supra note 9, at 23, http:/
/www.ecommerce.treasury.gov.au.
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enforce contract terms and arbitration results. Governments should
refuse to do so (and thus should refuse to stay litigation, enforce arbitral
awards, or give preclusive effect to arbitral awards) unless those processes
ensure an acceptable level of procedural fairness. Second, governments
(and the public) should have access to information about the nature and
results of the private complaints. When information about recurring
problems goes from the public domain (courts) to the private (ODR),
enforcement agencies and other advocacy groups lose valuable informa-
tion needed to monitor and enforce existing laws.155 "If the general pro-
duction of . . . information [about the activities of private entities]
diminishes significantly, there will of course be much less basis for public
critique and regulation-indeed, little basis even for an informed public
deference to business self-governance." 156 Third, since unregulated pri-
vate processes have the power to vary substantive law by contract, govern-
ments should also insist on certain mandatory laws that cannot be
contractually waived. 157 When government fora lose control over dis-
putes, they lose a large amount of control over the law. This is particularly
true in a country like the United States in which much of the implemen-
tation and enforcement of legal norms is left to private litigation. The
trend in Internet disputing to move disputes out of the courts and into
private processes, if unregulated, will not only change the litigants' own
process rights, but also effectively change the substantive law.
Government intervention may also be required to underwrite or
monitor any kind of private system adopted as a method for encouraging
acceptable standards for ODR. One method that has been suggested to
provide consumers with more reliable information about a merchant's
dispute resolution methods is the creation of private trustmark sys-
tems. 158 In order to be entitled to display the trustmark, the company
would have to adhere to agreed minimum standards in its dispute resolu-
tion procedures. Failure to do so could lead to censure or loss of the
151 See, e.g., Daniel Eisenberg, Anatomy of a Recall, TIME, Sept. 11, 2000, at 29
(describing how litigation regarding Firestone ATX tires became feasible only after
plaintiffs' lawyers secured discovery regarding consumer complaints and other
lawsuits, and judge allowed sharing of the information with lawyers involved in similar
suits).
156 Garth, supra note 99, at 386. See also Menkel-Meadow, supra note 15, at 46
(suggesting data collection to identify patterns of problems).
157 For example, Germany's highest civil court ruled that Microsoft cannot
prevent dealers from unbundling the software and selling it separately. This appears
to enforce traditional first sale rights despite Microsoft's desire to interpret the
transaction as a license that limits future uses. See Rick Perera, German Court Says OK to
Unbundling, INFOWOR.D.COM, July 7, 2000, at http://www.infoworld.com/articles.
Following this decision, prices for various Windows programs decreased 20-30% as a
secondary market developed. John Lettice, German Court Ruling Triggers 30% Price Cut
on Windows, REGISTER, Sep. 5, 2000, at http://www.theregister.co.uk/content/
archive//12985.html.
158 TASK FORcE ON E-COMMERCE & ALTERNATIVE DisPuTE RESOLUTION, supra note
59, at 5-12, http://www.law.washington.edu/ABA-eADR/drafts/2001 .05.21draft.
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mark. However, the difficulties of online enforcement (and the ease of
counterfeiting online graphics) may mean that the trustmark-sponsoring
organizations will seek aid in monitoring compliance or soliciting con-
sumer complaints.
In addition, since the trustmark providers will themselves be private
groups, some entity-like a government agency-will need to monitor
the provider to see that the alleged standards are acceptable and are
being enforced. 159 If the standards required for the award of the
trustmark are inadequate, the government should withhold any kind of
enforcement or participation. Further, the operation of the UDRP dem-
onstrates that there can be flaws in an ODR system both as it appears on
paper and in the way that system is implemented. Trustmarks, presuma-
bly, would be granted based on an analysis of a company's written pol-
icy.160 Even this step should require intense scrutiny. The rules, as they
would operate in context, need to be fair and notjust facially parallel. 16'
Then, the trustmark holders would need to be monitored by the
trustmark-granting entity to assure that the holders apply their ODR pro-
cedures in compliance with their written standards. 162 The government,
in turn, could monitor those who award trustmarks to be sure that the
public receives meaningful protection rather than just a pretty symbol on
a web page.
In order to ensure procedural fairness, governments may also need
to underwrite at least some of the cost of ODR systems. A private system
costs money, and someone has to pay for it. Yet to put a high price tag on
participation runs contrary to the goal of creating a process that is accessi-
ble and affordable, even for small disputes. It is not surprising that the
Better Business Bureau has suggested that the expense of effective sys-
159 The Task Force suggests that the standards might arise out of the "ODR
Provider community" itself. Id. at 7. Given the extremely minimal requirements
proposed by the "Electronic Commerce and Consumer Protection Group," it is hard
to generate a lot of optimism about how rigorous industry-sponsored trustmark
standards would be. See Brian Krebs, Groups Embrace E-commerce Dispute Resolution Plan,
NEwsBYTEs, June 7, 2000, at http://www.computeruser.com/news/00/06/07/newsl3.
html. Note that the "consumer protection group" consists of America Online, AT&T,
Dell Computer Corporation, IBM, Microsoft, Network Solutions, Time Warner Inc.,
and VISA U.S.A. Inc. The actual proposals are available online. ELEc. COMMERCE &
CONSUMER PROTECTION GROUP, GUIDELINES FOR MERCHANT-TO-CONSUMER TRANSAC-
TIONS AND COMMENTARY, at http://www.ecommercegroup.org/guidelines.htm (last
visited Nov. 13, 2001).
160 It might easily be less direct than that. A company would acquire a trustmark
based on its promise to refer disputes to some designated ODR provider, under that
ODR provider's rules.
161 See, e.g., the discussion of the differential impact of various UDRP procedures,
supra text accompanying notes 94-96.
162 The ABA Task force noted the problem of "what entity will monitor the
actions of third party ODR Providers that are offering services to the public." TASK
FORCE ON E-COMMERCE & ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION, supra note 59, at 6,
http://www.law.washington.edu/ABA-eADR/drafts/ 2001.05.21 draft.html.
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tems will require "a partnership among governments, nonprofit founda-
tions, academic institutions and the private sector" to ensure the
technological infrastructure will be created.163 It is also not surprising
that the ABA Task Force studying e-commerce has tentatively raised the
issue of the need for a government subsidy.?64 Governments, of course,
pay for the real court system and may be less than enthusiastic about
underwriting ODR processes when they already pay for courts. On the
other hand, it may take funding from an outside source to de-link the
ability to choose the dispute resolution provider and the potential bias of
the decision makers.' 65
Governments may instead put their resources into adapting the abil-
ity of existing court structures to deal with disputes quickly and effi-
ciently. It would be a mistake to assume the real world courts will not
adopt some of the more effective technologies available if it will save
money or generate convenience. The U.S. federal courts, for example,
have already made a great deal of information available online through
their PACER system.' 66 Courts hold conferences and even oral argu-
ments by teleconference to save attorneys the time and expense of travel-
ing to the courthouse. 167 Telephonic and videotape depositions are
already here, as are electronic filing and electronic briefs. 168 The trial of
the future may bear little resemblance to the single-event, in-person
norm of today. 169 Some states may create special court systems to handle
163 COUNCIL OF BETrER BUSINESS BuREAus, supra note 47, at 13, http://
www.bbbonline.org/about/press/whitepaper.doc. In addition to the technology
costs, arbitrators and mediators need to be paid. It is noteworthy that within the first
year of its operation, the fees charged by the DRPs under the ICANN process had
already increased dramatically. King, supra note 74, at 503. WIPO's panelists, for
example, receive $1,000 to decide a case involving one or two domain names, and all
they generally need do is read the paperwork and write an opinion. This already far
exceeds the amount in controversy in many consumer disputes. Resolving disputes
that are longer and more fact-intensive would likely require even higher fees.
164 TASK FORCE ON E-COMMERCE & ALTERNATIVE DisPuTE RESOLUTION, supra note
59, at 10, http://www.law.washington.edu/ABA-eADR/drafts/2001 .05.21draft.
165 Cf King, supra note 74, at 501.
([A]s long as the providers are dependent on getting their fees from
Complainants, and thus have an interest in keeping Complainants happy, we are
in danger of having a biased system. While it would not be fair to require the
respondent to pay the fees, ICANN should try to develop a system under which
the Complainants are not the sole source of money for the Providers.).
166 Directory of Electronic Public Access Services to Automated Information in
the United States Federal Courts, at http://pacer.psc .uscourts.gov/pubaccess.html.
167 See, e.g., 8TH TEX. APp. (EL PAso) Loc. R. 39.4, http://www.8thcoa
.courts.state.tx.us/Rules.pdf. Lawyers who lack in-house teleconferencing equipment
have participated in oral argument through support systems available at Kinko's.
Conversation between Beth Thornburg and ChiefJustice David Chew, Apr. 19, 2001.
168 Gordon Bermant, Courting the Virtual: Federal Courts in an Age of Complete Inter-
Connectedness, 25 OHIO N.U. L. REv. 527, 543 (1999) (appellate briefs being filed in
CD-ROM format).
169 Paul D. Carrington, Virtual Civil Litigation: A Visit to John Bunyan's Celestial City,
98 COLUM. L. REv. 1516 (1998).
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e-commerce or other Internet disputes. 170 Courts are also adopting time
standards that are intended to limit the period from case filing to final
disposition.17 '
Those searching for uniformity through ODR must also be aware
that individual governments will not necessarily yield their role in law-
making just because a private system is in place. For example, the state of
California decided to provide even greater protection to the performers
of the future wanting their own names as domain names. It therefore
passed (unanimously) its own statute protecting personal names, despite
the UDRP and despite the laws of other states and nations.' 7 2 National
courts can also be expected to apply existing laws to Internet disputes. 173
Other states or nations may refuse to compel arbitration, whether online
or otherwise, and may allow lawsuits to proceed despite the existence of
arbitration clauses. No system can provide protection from divergent
standards unless everyone defers to it.
VI. CONCLUSION
The problems of differing legal standards, choice of law, personal
jurisdiction, and enforcement of judgments in global interactions are
real, and are not going away. ODR does not solve them, but it could pro-
vide a Band-Aid until a better solution comes along. Well-designed ADR
systems will always play a role if they are a truly consensual alternative to
formal court structures. Private systems, however, are only useful if the
applicable law is legitimate and the applicable procedures are actually
fair.
170 Pam Belluck, Michigan Plans a High-Tech Lure, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2001, at
A10 (reporting that to lure tech companies to Michigan, its governor wants to
establish a separate "cybercourt" for cases involving technology and high-tech
businesses, a court in which virtually everything would be done via computer rather
than in a courtroom).
171 See, e.g., TEX. R. Crv. PRO. 190 (discovery control plans); TEX. R. Crv. PRO.
165a (allowing cases to be dismissed for want of prosecution if they fail to comply with
time standards contained in Rules of Judicial Administration). Unfortunately,
governments also fail to provide sufficient funding to staff the court system so that it is
capable of disposing of the cases within the mandated deadlines.
172 See Lynda Gledhill, New Law on CyberPiracy, S.F. GATE, Aug. 23, 2000, at http:/
/www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/chronicle/archive (describing new statute
that includes protection of "promising newcomers who may not meet federal
'sufficiently famous' standards but whose names might be pirated" and making it bad
faith just to register the name, with no "use" required). The California law also creates
a remedy of restitution and a fine as well as transfer of the domain name. See also
David McGuire, California Passes Sweeping Anti-Cybersquatting Law, NEWSBVTs, Aug. 23,
2000, at http://www.newsbytes.com/pubNews/00/154103.html (questioning whether
state courts provide the best venue to resolve disputes over globally available domain
names).
173 See, e.g., Dinwoodie, supra note 66, at 508 n.43 (citing cases from China,
France, Germany, India, and the United Kingdom applying unfair competition law to
domain name disputes).
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Unfortunately, in settings involving power imbalances, the systems
designed to date have not met the due process sniff test. Acceptable rules
could be geared toward providing affordable access to the process,
notice, a method for sharing relevant information, a reliable way of
resolving factual disputes, the use of truly unbiased decision makers, pro-
cess transparency, written reasoned opinions, and some kind of meaning-
ful appeal. The system would balance cost and fairness in ways that
impact parties evenly. It would not be mandatory, but rather would have
to attract parties who were not compelled to participate.
Government, too, will need to stay engaged in the ODR debate. Pri-
vate law adopted globally suffers from a lack of legitimacy; one must ask
whether the entity attempting to impose rules has any right to do so.
Many types of disputes are simply not suitable for a privatized resolution,
especially a nonconsensual one. They involve too many issues of impor-
tant public policies, often policies that affect people other than the
immediate disputants, to allow a private group to choose the rule they
like best and make it the "law." Also, public interests that balance private
property and contract rights under real world governments (including
free speech, an intellectual commons, and consumer protection) must
not be eliminated from these privatized systems. Neither voluntary indus-
try self-regulation nor ad hoc case law developments will be enough to
assure that important values are protected in Internet dispute resolution.
The prohibition of private processes would also leave parties unpro-
tected. In the context of small dollar disputes in cross-border transac-
tions, the public court systems provide an inadequate solution.
Nevertheless, private dispute resolution must be both substantively and
procedurallyjust. An ODR system that stacks the deck is only an improve-
ment in public relations, not in access to justice. Rather than repeat plati-
tudes about the "unique qualities of the Internet,"174 we must face its
impact on the real world before blessing a process to settle its disputes.
174 WHITE HOUSE, A FRAMEWORK FOR GLOBAL ELECTRONIC COMMERCE 3 (July 1,
1997), at http://www.ecommerce.gov/framewrk.htm.
